The Middle East prior to October 7, 2023, was already unstable, with regional rivalries, Arab springs, Iranian assertiveness, the ISIS caliphate, and the Abraham Accords redefining the balance of power.
After the attack by Hamas, Israel responded massively, involving the Iranian axis (Hezbollah, Houthis, Iraqi militias), polarizing and militarizing the region. After October 7, the US strengthened the anti-Iran front, Sunni Arabs coordinated with Israel, and Iran’s sphere of influence eroded.
In this landscape, Italy uses its soft power (culture, diplomacy, UNIFIL missions, Aspides, Prima Parthica) to influence without coercion, building trust with Arabs, Israel, but also Iran. Rome adopts a balanced line on Palestine: it supports two states, but recognition is conditional on reforms, security, and UN multilateralism. It maintains relations with Jordan, Egypt, the Gulf countries, and Iran for de-escalation. Italy resists the temptation of unilateral recognition (like France or Spain), preferring gradualism and support for UNRWA/AP, and offers itself for the reconstruction of Gaza.
Thanks to the personal relationship between Meloni and Trump, Italy’s role accelerates but puts its reputation at risk.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
– October 7, 2023, redrew the balance of power in the Middle East, intensifying regional polarization, the role of the United States, the containment of Iran, and the realignment of Arab powers, with new strategic implications for Europe and Italy.
– After October 7, Italy intensified its use of diplomatic soft power in the Middle East to manage the consequences of the Israeli-Palestinian escalation, seeking to preserve regional stability and protect its strategic interests.
– Rome exploited multilateral instruments such as the UN, the EU, and peacekeeping missions, consolidating its role in mediation and strengthening its collaboration with other international actors involved in crisis management.
– Bilateral diplomacy has been geared toward dialogue with Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and Arab nations, seeking to secure Italy’s role as a neutral and reliable mediator, capable of facilitating aid coordination and post-conflict reconstruction.
– Rome’s stance in resisting pressure from key allies such as France, the United Kingdom, and Spain to recognize a Palestinian state has also highlighted Italy’s “particularity” and diplomatic neutrality on key issues in the Middle East and the Israeli-Palestinian question.
– Italy’s strategy faces significant challenges, including internal political constraints, the need for coordination with the EU and NATO, limited influence compared to other powers, and the complexity of bilateral relations in unstable contexts.
ENGLISH VERSION
The geopolitical context in the Middle East
In recent years, the Middle East has experienced a period of profound instability, fueled by regional rivalries, strategic repositioning, and a gradual deterioration of the security structures that had managed, albeit fragilely, the regional order over the past two decades. The years leading up to October 7, 2023, were marked by converging phenomena that made the Middle East one of the most complex and unpredictable theaters globally. These included the redefinition of regional balances after the ‘Arab Spring’ of 2011, Iran’s growing assertiveness in the Middle East and the Levant, the emergence and fall of the Caliphate in Iraq and Syria, energy and technological competition between the United States, Russia, and China, and the normalization between Israel and the Gulf countries initiated by the Abraham Accords. All these elements have defined and continue to define the entire region.
The Middle East before October 7
Even before 2023, the Middle East was undergoing a profound transformation. The Gulf monarchies, driven by ambitious reform programs (from Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030[1] to the economic diversification strategies of the Emirates and Qatar), were gaining increasing autonomy from the United States and a more assertive role in setting the regional agenda, even on issues traditionally considered sensitive. At the same time, Iran was consolidating a dense network of non-state armed actors and key allies (from Hamas to Hezbollah, from the Houthis to the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces, via Syrian President Bashar al-Assad) used as instruments to project influence and as destabilizing levers in various crisis theaters. In Israel, during the same period, unprecedented internal political polarization intensified, putting pressure on the institutional architecture and fueling an increasingly conflictual debate on security, national identity, and the management of disputed territories. Israeli deterrence, while maintaining one of the most advanced technological and military capabilities in the world, began to show vulnerabilities attributable more to the fragility of the political framework than to a deficit in its operational capabilities. In this context, already marked by structural tensions and increasingly fluid regional competition, the terrorist attack of October 7, 2023, exploded like a historic fracture, altering the security balance and accelerating dynamics that had been underway for some time. The unprecedented operation launched by Hamas against Israel represented not only a dramatic violation of Israeli security, but also the systemic collapse of an entire model of conflict management. Tel Aviv’s response was massive, prolonged, and multi-level, triggering a chain reaction that involved the entire pro-Iranian axis: Hezbollah intensified its attacks from Lebanon, the Houthis destabilized the Red Sea, Iraqi and Syrian militias struck Israeli and American targets, while Tehran acted as a political-strategic coordinator, which then led to direct large-scale involvement. The result was a Middle East radically different from the one that had existed before. More polarized, more militarized, but also more open to the possibility of new diplomatic realignments.
The Middle East after October 7
The wave of instability following October 7 has redefined the balance of power in the region. The Israeli offensive against Hamas’s main allies and the consequent weakening of the operational capabilities of Hezbollah, the Houthis, and, indirectly, the Iranian ayatollahs, has prompted the United States to strengthen its commitment in the wider Mediterranean. At the same time, Sunni Arab states have intensified diplomatic and intelligence coordination with Tel Aviv, with the common goal of containing Iranian influence[2]. Faced with this new configuration, Iran has been forced to review its strategic posture, seeking to avoid a direct escalation with Israel and Washington. It is in this context that three fundamental axes of the new Middle Eastern geopolitics have emerged. The first is the US attempt to build a new regional security architecture focused on anti-Iranian measures and normalization between Israel and the main Arab states within the framework of the Abraham Accords [3]. The second is the progressive erosion of Iranian influence, due to economic and military pressure as well as growing internal instability and diplomatic isolation. The third, but not least, is the return of Syria as a geopolitical actor following the flight of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and thanks to the resumption of contacts with Washington and the Arab states, which see Damascus as a possible piece in the containment of Tehran and the stabilization of the Levant[4].
Soft power as Rome’s secret weapon
In this realignment of new players and old regional dynamics, Italian soft power has been one of Italy’s most effective means of navigating a constantly changing geopolitical context. Soft power represents a state’s ability to influence other international actors through attraction, legitimacy, and persuasion, rather than through military coercion or direct economic pressure. A concept developed by Joseph Nye, soft power is based on culture, shared values, international reputation, reliable institutions, and policies perceived as credible. Historically, Italy has developed a unique form of soft power, combining cultural and artistic heritage, language, gastronomy, discreet diplomacy, and international cooperation, which has allowed it to build a reputation as a pragmatic, reliable, and non-ideological country. This approach has been particularly effective in the Middle East, where geopolitical dynamics require interlocutors who are perceived as neutral, competent, and credible. The Italian approach has always been centered on this concept and for decades has been the nation’s most important weapon. Over the years, Rome has played a key role on all shores of the Mediterranean and North Africa, promoting technical cooperation programs, professional training, and economic assistance, strengthening its image as a bridge between Europe and the Arab world. Italy has also consolidated its soft power in the region by investing in cultural diplomacy, promoting the Italian language and artistic and academic initiatives, creating a network of influence based on trust and reputation rather than on force or immediate economic interest. In this context, Rome has been able to build stable, long-term relationships with key players in the Middle East. It has maintained privileged channels with Egypt and Jordan, which are fundamental to regional stability, and with the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, which are central to Arab diplomacy and the financing of development and reconstruction projects. But Italian soft power has also taken the form of a military presence. In addition to its stabilizing role in Lebanon through its leading participation in UNIFIL, Rome has maintained a constant presence in the Multinational Force & Observers in Sinai[5], contributing to security in the Strait of Tiran, which connects the Gulf of Aqaba to the Red Sea. More recently, it has taken on a key role in the European EUNAVFOR Aspides mission[6] to protect commercial traffic in the Gulf of Aden and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait threatened by the Houthis. Similarly, Italy has extended its military commitment to Iraq with Operation Prima Parthica[7], part of the international coalition against ISIS. All these missions, often carried out in UN, EU, or multilateral coalition contexts, have allowed Italy to present itself as a reliable, cooperative, and non-aggressive power, strengthening its network of regional trust and integrating cultural projection with a military presence perceived as an instrument of collective security and stabilization rather than of immediate or hegemonic national interest. Through this combination of multilateral diplomacy, cultural and educational cooperation, humanitarian interventions, and non-aggressive military presences, Italy has thus consolidated a platform of soft power that allows it to be ready to intervene in complex crisis situations, anticipating and facilitating decisive roles in post-crisis management without compromising its neutrality and credibility in the eyes of regional actors.
Italy’s role in the region
Since October 7, 2023, and the war in Gaza, as well as subsequent regional developments, an element that is often underestimated in the national public debate has become increasingly evident. Namely, Italy’s return as a credible actor in the multilateral management of crises in the wider Mediterranean. Unlike other European countries, Rome has adopted a balanced and consistent approach to the Palestinian question, based on three pillars in which multilateral diplomacy and the centrality of the UN are the foundation of international law. Italy was among the first European countries to support the need for a multilateral framework for managing the post-October 7 crisis. [8] The Farnesina has also worked actively to support ceasefire initiatives monitored by international bodies and promoted greater involvement of UNRWA and UN agencies in humanitarian management.[9] This stance has restored Italy’s diplomatic credibility, thanks in part to its tradition of Mediterranean mediation and its central position in that quadrant. Since the outbreak of the Gaza war, Italy has intensified its diplomatic engagement with all actors in the region and significantly strengthened its strategic relations with Jordan, Egypt, and Lebanon, which are seen as crucial interlocutors for the stability of a future stabilization of the Strip and the borders with Israel. At the same time, Rome has significantly strengthened its strategic relations with the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, in a context of cooperation that is not only economic but above all strategic. Even with Iran, Italy has maintained a prudent and multi-level diplomacy, combining political firmness and openness to dialogue even in moments of maximum tension. After the regional crisis intensified, Rome used its bilateral channels and those of the European Union to express concern about the activities of pro-Iranian militias in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon, asking Tehran to contribute to de-escalation and reduce the risk of a direct confrontation with Israel[10]. At the same time, Italy has been at the forefront of European diplomatic efforts to bring Iran back to the negotiating table on nuclear issues, believing that non-proliferation remains an indispensable element for regional stability. The Foreign Ministry has also maintained a limited but active economic and cultural dialogue, aimed at preserving a channel of communication with Tehran and avoiding the country’s complete isolation, in the belief that only through constant dialogue is it possible to influence regional dynamics and contain the destabilizing pressures of the Iranian axis[11]. These relations are not only political, but also integrate economic, security, and infrastructural dimensions: Italy actively supports reconstruction plans in Gaza, engages in dialogue on maritime security and trade routes, and contributes to multilateral stabilization missions throughout the Middle East. All this is reinforced by its reputation as a pragmatic and reliable actor, not ideological, but deeply involved in Arab diplomacy, in a mix where soft power, economic cooperation, and strategic support come together in a coherent and credible way.
Italian resistance and Rome’s peculiarity with regard to the recognition of the Palestinian state
Italy has for years maintained a cautious but strategic position on the recognition of the Palestinian state, which in recent months has been reiterated on several occasions by Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani following the unilateral recognition of the Palestinian state by France, the United Kingdom, and Spain. [12] Rome supports the principle of two peoples and two states, but believes that recognition should be subject to reciprocal political conditions with Israel, in order to avoid unilateral acts that could further destabilize the region. In particular, it emphasizes the need for concrete progress in security, Palestinian governance, and the protection of civil rights before formalizing recognition. Similarly, Italy’s resistance is the result of a strategy aimed at balancing both internal and external political pressures. Italy has always avoided symbolic gestures that could compromise its role as a reliable mediator and instead focuses on concrete actions: support for UNRWA, humanitarian corridors, cooperation with Jordan, Egypt, the Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, and constant dialogue with Israel. Currently, Italy’s position has also been confirmed by Tajani’s statements following the partial release of hostages by Hamas, when the minister stressed that the conditions for progressive recognition of the Palestinian state are now closer, but that Italy will continue to favor a gradual approach, based on international guarantees and internal reforms of Palestinian governance, before formally recognizing the State of Palestine. [13] With regard to the Palestinian Authority, Italy follows a line based on support for local institutions and humanitarian assistance. Since 2023, Rome has maintained and partly increased its contributions to the PA’s capacity-building programs, supporting European initiatives in the areas of administrative training, support for security forces, and management of essential public services in the West Bank[14]. In the context of the Gaza crisis, it has increased funding for international organizations active in the Palestinian territories and participated in multilateral planning of humanitarian corridors, channelling aid both through the EU and through bilateral missions of Italian Cooperation[15]. Furthermore, in coordination with its main European and Arab partners, it has stressed the importance of preserving the functionality of the Palestinian Authority as an institutional actor, arguing that any credible post-conflict political process must involve its direct involvement in governance and reconstruction dynamics. As previously noted, Italy’s resistance to the immediate recognition of the Palestinian state is therefore not an ideological rejection, but a strategic choice that combines diplomatic prudence, multilateral engagement, and the targeted use of soft power, allowing Rome to maintain a central and credible role in defining the future political structure of the region. The Middle East after October 7 is not simply a new chapter in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but a structural change in the entire regional order. In this fluid scenario, Italy has the opportunity and responsibility to consolidate a role that in recent years seemed to be waning: that of diplomatic bridge, credible multilateral actor, and mediator between the Arab world, the United States, Israel, Iran, and international institutions. Its strength lies in its credibility, moderation, diplomatic doctrine, and lack of hegemonic ambitions. All these elements, now more than ever, represent added value in the turbulent landscape of the wider Mediterranean.
Italy’s possible role in the reconstruction of Gaza and the Meloni-Trump relationship
Italy has quickly transformed its historic humanitarian and diplomatic role into a concrete strategy of presence on the Gaza dossier, proposing itself not only as a donor but as an operational partner for reconstruction, governance, and post-conflict stabilization. Rome has officially confirmed its willingness to do its part[16] in the international plan promoted by the United States and its Arab partners, participating in discussions on financing, humanitarian corridors, the composition and mandate of any international stabilization forces, and the creation of task forces for reconstruction (civil infrastructure, health services, training) that could involve Italian companies and multilateral instruments to ensure transparency and control over aid. The reconstruction of Gaza after the devastation has become an area in which Rome has sought to present itself as a technical and reliable player. Italy has put three main assets on the table: engineering expertise, logistical leadership (tested in missions such as UNIFIL, MFO Sinai, Lebanon 2006, Iraq 2015–2020), and its ability to maintain open relations with everyone—Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Egypt, Qatar, Jordan, and the United States. On an operational level, Giorgia Meloni’s government has relaunched initiatives already underway (such as the Food for Gaza program[17] and the resumption of funding to UNRWA after neutrality checks) and has prepared the logistics for large-scale humanitarian shipments. Palazzo Chigi has convened summits and created interministerial task forces to coordinate economic, health, and emergency management contributions, while the Ministry of Defense and the Carabinieri have been mentioned as possible components of stabilization or security support missions for humanitarian corridors[18]. However, Italy’s choice must also be viewed in the broader geopolitical context: the political and operational agreement with the Trump administration, culminating in the sharing of a peace/ceasefire plan that envisages an international role for stabilization and massive reconstruction, has made Rome one of the most visible European allies in the implementation phase of the American project. Furthermore, the Meloni-Trump convergence (between bilateral meetings, public support, and a common emphasis on the role of Arab donor countries) accelerated Italy’s offer of technical leadership but also exposed Rome to reputational risks in the region and tensions with European partners. On a practical-political level, the Italian government has set clear conditions (reunification of the Palestinian political framework around interlocutors deemed legitimate, guarantees on the exclusion of Hamas from government roles, and the release of hostages), elements that reflect Rome’s political line but which will have to be managed in multilateral negotiations so as not to block funding and projects in their infancy. In the meantime, Italy has participated in European initiatives (for example, on the management of the Rafah crossing and the relaunch of EU missions[19]) and has engaged in bilateral channels with key Arab partners (Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, the Emirates, Saudi Arabia) to secure co-financing and regional consensus on the proposed formulas[20]. These choices translate into practical opportunities for the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip. Although many measures are still in the planning stage and there are no public operating contracts yet, Rome’s position could allow Italian companies access to contracts in the construction, water management, health, and logistics sectors, as well as in the formation of future local institutions and the definition of security guarantees. The political risk, however, is that of too close an alignment with Washington, which could erode Rome’s credibility as a neutral mediator in the eyes of Arab and Palestinian public opinion and complicate relations with EU partners concerned about the excessive spectacle surrounding the reconstruction. Finally, the personal and political relationship between Meloni and Trump carries weight. Media visibility and direct access to Washington have facilitated Italy’s presence at the decision-making tables and the acceleration of concrete commitments (from humanitarian corridors to financial contributions), but they also pose Rome with the dual task of converting this political leverage into credible administrative capacity. That is, to demonstrate leadership and bureaucratic management of one of the most politicized and publicized crises in the world, while at the same time preserving the international legitimacy of its role by avoiding a narrative of reconstruction at the expense of the Palestinian cause.
The limits of Italian diplomacy and strategic conclusions
Despite its apparent centrality, Italian diplomacy in the Gaza dossier continues to face profound and structural limitations. The first concerns the lack of uniformity in European foreign policy, which forces Rome to operate in a context where every initiative risks being absorbed or contradicted by uncoordinated choices made by other member states. This fragmentation reduces the leverage of Italian action and forces the Foreign Ministry to constantly balance national expectations and EU constraints. A second limitation concerns the material capacity of the Italian state. The budget for development cooperation, already modest compared to that of the main European players, struggles to support multi-year projects in geopolitically intense areas such as Gaza. Even the military dimension, although professionalized and appreciated, is constrained by limited resources, tight rotation cycles, and a public opinion traditionally reluctant to accept risky or costly missions. Added to this is Italy’s difficulty in transforming its soft power into effective political results. Italy enjoys significant cultural, humanitarian, and technical prestige, but rarely manages to translate this into concrete strategic influence. While other actors similar to Italy in terms of GDP and strategic projection have instruments of direct pressure (military, energy, economic) at their disposal, Rome relies almost exclusively on credibility and personal relationships. Without more substantial material support, this approach risks losing its effectiveness as the region becomes increasingly polarized. A further factor of vulnerability is the volatility of Italian domestic politics, characterized by rapid cycles, poor bureaucratic continuity, and public opinion that is extremely reactive to developments in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These elements limit the government’s ability to develop stable strategic lines, especially when it comes to long-term commitments such as reconstruction and post-war management of the Strip. Finally, Italian diplomacy must operate in an environment dominated by assertive powers such as Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Israel, all of which have far superior economic, military, or ideological leverage. In this context, Italy benefits from its image as a neutral actor, but at the same time often finds itself marginalized in the definition of decisive dynamics. Despite these limitations, some strategic conclusions emerge. Italy can consolidate a significant role in the Gaza dossier only by adopting a more structured approach: investing in technical leadership in reconstruction, assuming a stable role as political facilitator between the United States, Israel, and Arab actors, and seeking to promote a European Mediterranean coalition that overcomes the current fragmentation. The privileged relationship with the Trump administration may offer a significant advantage in the short term, but it also carries a risk in the long term: without an autonomous vision and agreements independent of the leadership of the moment, Italy risks becoming a tactical partner rather than a strategic actor. The future challenge, therefore, is to transform Italy’s traditional diplomatic culture, based on dialogue, management, and mediation, into a long-term strategy capable of keeping pace with the new Middle East, which is more competitive and reactive, more fragmented, and much less predictable than in the past.
[1] https://www.vision2030.gov.sa/en
[2] https://www.icij.org/news/2025/10/arab-states-deepened-military-ties-with-israel-while-denouncing-gaza-war-leak-reveals/
[3] https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/news/the-abraham-accords-declaration-15-dep-2020/en/English_ABRAHAM_ACCORDS_Abraham-Accords-Israel-Bahrain-Agreement-15-Sep-2020.pdf
[4] https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/12/after-assads-fall-gulf-states-see-risks-and-rewards-syria
[5] https://www.marina.difesa.it/EN/operations/Pagine/mfo.aspx
[6] https://www.difesa.it/operazionimilitari/op-intern-corso/eunavfor-aspides/situazione/48427.html
[7] https://www.difesa.it/operazionimilitari/op-intern-corso/prima-parthica/default/28186.html
[8] https://www.esteri.it/en/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/comunicati/2025/07/dichiarazione-congiunta-su-gaza-e-i-territori-palestinesi-occupati/
[9] https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2024/05/italy-resume-funding-un-agency-palestinian-refugees
[10] https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/italy-hopes-iran-will-pressure-proxies-to-de-escalate-mideast-tension/3340246
[11] https://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/politica/2025/06/13/israele-attacca-liran.-meloni-convoca-una-riunione-di-governo.-tajani-nessun_322922e0-242b-4bf9-b0e6-cd6ea6c4cec9.html
[12] https://it.euronews.com/2025/09/22/la-francia-si-unisce-a-regno-unito-portogallo-e-canada-e-riconosce-lo-stato-palestinese
[13] https://tg24.sky.it/politica/2025/10/15/gaza-informativa-tajani-parlamento
[14] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/it/policies/eu-humanitarian-support-to-palestinians/
[15] https://www.esteri.it/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/comunicati/2025/06/nuovi-fondi-a-sostegno-di-unicef-e-delloms-per-gaza-e-la-palestina/
[16] https://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/politica/2025/10/15/palazzo-chigi-strategia-per-emergenze-e-ricostruzione-a-gaza_50f0e36f-dcee-415f-ba05-9489ee9ca6e9.html
[17] https://www.esteri.it/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/comunicati/2024/07/iniziativa-umanitaria-food-for-gaza-al-via-un-progetto-pam-farnesina-per-aiuti-alimentari-alla-popolazione-di-gaza/
[18] https://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/cronaca/2025/10/09/medio-oriente-caschi-blu-e-carabinieri-il-contributo-italiano-al-piano_c869062f-8c71-422a-8ea4-02f72e0cadc2.html
[19] https://www.esteri.it/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/comunicati/2025/01/comunicato-congiunto-esteri-difesa-litalia-partecipa-alla-missione-eubam-rafah-per-il-sostegno-umanitario-al-valico-di-rafah/
[20] https://www.esteri.it/en/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondimenti/2025/08/italian-fm-to-asharq-al-awsat-rome-riyadh-share-goal-of-middle-east-peace-asharq-al-awsat-2/