The election in Saxony-Anhalt on 6 September, the third in Germany since the start of the year, seems of little significance when compared with those held at the end of winter (Baden-Württemberg and Rhineland-Palatinate) and those due to take place at the end of September (the regional elections in Berlin, Thuringia and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania); however, its significance may have been underestimated, particularly abroad.
Never before has a local election in a Land as vast yet relatively unimportant as Saxony-Anhalt had the potential to have unexpected repercussions across the continent, much like the classic snowflake that triggers an avalanche. A region that has always leaned towards conservatism, this little-known corner of Germany has, since reunification, been a stronghold of the Christian Democrats (CDU). This has not, however, prevented the formation of broad-based local coalitions, particularly between the CDU and the Social Democrats (SPD), which were joined in 2016 by the Greens, following the surge of the populist AfD, who rose from zero to 24.2 per cent.
A ‘poor’ and sparsely populated Land
Saxony-Anhalt, as mentioned, is very little known outside Germany. A very large but sparsely populated Land, it is the same size as the wealthy Hesse, but has less than a third of its population, just 2,186,000. It belonged to the German Democratic Republic (GDR) before being reunified with the rest of the Federal Republic in 1991 and shares with the rest of Central and Eastern Europe all the problematic legacies of socialist political systems. It is a predominantly agricultural region, largely covered by forests, fields and small villages, where the most populous town, Halle an der Saale, has a population of less than 240,000. The Land is cut off from the major tourist flows coming into Germany, which are mainly directed towards Bavaria, the Rhine Valley and Berlin. Its capital, the small city of Magdeburg, is virtually unknown abroad. The Land’s gross regional product is among the lowest in the Federal Republic, standing at 62.6 billion euros compared with 281 billion in Hesse, 610 billion in Bavaria and 697 billion in North Rhine-Westphalia. In 2019, Saxony-Anhalt also ranked last among the German Länder in terms of GDP per capita, at 28,800 euros per capita (equivalent to that of Liguria), compared with 39,678 in North Rhine-Westphalia, 46,923 in Hesse and 48,323 in Bavaria.
Owing to its underdevelopment resulting from its past as part of the Warsaw Pact, like all the Länder of the former GDR, Saxony-Anhalt has had to endure – and, to some extent, still endures – a dramatic population exodus.
Since 1990, the Land has witnessed a veritable exodus towards the wealthier regions of western Germany, bringing these areas close to demographic collapse. For twenty years following reunification, the Land lost over 130,000 residents every five years, and it was only in 2010 that the decline was managed to be kept below 100,000. The region’s population has fallen by 680,000 since the fall of the Wall, mainly due to emigration. Put simply, since the Iron Curtain came down, one in four residents has packed their bags and never returned. This dramatic exodus continues to some extent even today, given that, despite massive aid programmes – which are often met with resistance west of the Elbe – jobs remain scarce and purchasing power remains low, particularly in the wake of the devastating inflation currently affecting the country following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
For these reasons too, Saxony-Anhalt, like all the Länder of the former GDR with the exception of the city-state of Berlin, has a very low proportion of residents with foreign citizenship, at just 5.5 per cent of the population (mainly Eastern Europeans), compared with 14.9 per cent in Bavaria, 15.4 per cent in North Rhine-Westphalia and 18.1 per cent in Hesse. The birth rate remains low, and it is considered reasonably likely that by no later than 2030 the population of the Land will fall below two million, a figure lower than that of Hamburg’s population.
A centrist stronghold. Until now
The combination of these factors has meant that, in Saxony-Anhalt and elsewhere, anti-establishment parties have found fertile ground to gain a foothold.Ostalgia – the phenomenon of nostalgia for the old communist system of the GDR, though greatly overrated outside Germany – has always found support in these parts. Exactly fifteen years ago, in the 2011 regional elections, Die Linke, the post-communist party descended from East Germany’s former SED, still won over one in four voters, propelling its candidate Wulf Gallert to second place behind the local CDU ras Reiner Haseloff, who was unassailable on 36.2 per cent, whilst the neo-Nazis of the NPD hovered around the 5 per cent electoral threshold. Over time, however, support for Die Linke has eroded, partly in favour of other left-wing parties (mainly the Greens) and partly in favour of the right-wing AfD, which is hugely popular here and, according to the polls, is the dominant party, as it now is across much of Germany.
As already mentioned, it was here that Alternative für Deutschland recorded one of its best performances, exactly ten years ago, when the ultra-nationalist André Poggenburg – who later left the party – managed to propel the AfD into second place, taking many votes away from the CDU itself and forcing Haseloff to bring the Greens (and, five years later, the FDP as well) into his coalition. Furthermore, here at the Rittergut in Schnellroda, not far from Halle, was the headquarters of the Institut für Staatspolitik (IfS), long the AfD’s leading ideological think-tank, directed by the publisher Götz Kubitschek, who is also in charge of the think-tank’s publishing house, Verlag Antaios, which is hugely popular across the German right and has regularly placed some of its publications on Germany’s bestseller lists.
Whilst in the west right-wing populists have only recently seen their support grow, in the country’s former communist region – long dominated by the AfD’s identitarian faction, known as Der Flügel and led by the identitarian nationalist Björn Höcke – the party’s dominance is well established. Elections in recent years have, in fact, highlighted a clear trend: where the AfD moderated its stance – which occurred mainly in the western regions dominated by the party’s liberal-conservative faction – its vote share declined; whereas where the party remained anchored to its radically right-wing (though not neo-Nazi) origins, its support increased or at least remained stable. This development subsequently led to the definitive dominance of Höcke’s identitarian faction within the party, an event that paved the way for the party’s rise even west of the Elbe, transforming it from an ‘Eastern League’ into a truly federal party. The splits, whilst they did occur, proved to lead nowhere. In this regard, the fates of two parties – both of which vanished into thin air – served as a lesson: the moderate Blaue Partei (Blue Party), a liberal splinter group led by former leader Frauke Petry, and Aufbruch Deutscher Patrioten (Dawn of German Patriots), an ultra-nationalist splinter group founded by none other than the former candidate in Saxony-Anhalt, André Poggenburg.
The candidates
Until now, despite the AfD’s rapid rise, Saxony-Anhalt had never really been in doubt. A safe stronghold for the CDU, the Land was led, until last January, by Reiner Haseloff, a popular local centrist ras who had been in office since 2011; last January, after resigning, he handed the reins to his 47-year-old heir apparent, Sven Schulze, tasking him with seeing out the final eight months of his term and, if possible, winning the upcoming elections. Unsurprisingly, the legacy of a ‘heavyweight’ such as Haseloff proved from the outset to be very difficult to live up to, and the significant shift of centrist support towards the right – duly recorded by the polls – only served to confirm this.
To stand against Schulze, the AfD has fielded the 35-year-old entrepreneur and popular TikToker Ulrich Siegmund, a former co-chair of the party in the Land and a rising star of the major right-wing populist party. The third prominent candidate will certainly be Eva von Angern of the radical left (Die Linke), a 50-year-old lawyer from Magdeburg and a member of the very last generation of SED cadres, whose training came to an end almost simultaneously with the fall of the Wall.
The Brandmauer is now crumbling
Polls suggest that Siegmund could achieve an excellent, not to say resounding, result, far surpassing that of his predecessor Oliver Kirchner five years ago. According to the latest INSA poll, the AfD would rise from 21 per cent in 2021 to 42 per cent, doubling its support, whilst the CDU – which, in addition to Haseloff’s withdrawal, is also paying the price for a federal government at an all-time low in terms of popularity – would fall from 37 per cent to 22 per cent. Die Linke is projected to secure around 13 per cent of the vote, two points more than five years ago, whilst the SPD, the junior partner in the federal government in Berlin, is languishing at 6 per cent, just one point above the 5 per cent electoral threshold. All the other parties, from the Greens to the liberals of the FDP, would be excluded from the Landtag, the local parliament, falling below the fateful 5 per cent threshold; however, this threshold might be narrowly cleared by the BSW led by the ‘red-brown’ Sahra Wagenknecht, whose two candidates, Claudia Wittig and Thomas Schulze, could prove decisive for a genuine change of regime in Magdeburg.
If the INSA figures were confirmed, it would amount to an earthquake, as the Brandmauer – that is, the cordon sanitaire designed to rule out, at all costs, any government involving parties to the right of the CDU through improbable and unpopular ‘anti-fascist coalitions’ (in this case between the CDU, SPD and Linke) – would fall one point short of the AfD. In this scenario, the only way to form a government in the Land would be to build a centre-right coalition between the AfD and the CDU. Whilst this scenario has long been taboo for many German centrists, in the former Land of the GDR it is meeting with a more open-minded reception. When asked by the MDR channel about his willingness to govern with the AfD, the CDU candidate Schulze replied with a terse “we’ll see” – a response that sent a chill down the spine of the party leadership in Berlin and immediately sent shockwaves through the left across the country.
The situation would be even more serious if the SPD were to fail to win a seat in the Landtag; at which point an already likely coalition between the AfD and the CDU – with Chancellor Merz’s party as a minority partner – would be inevitable, with consequences that are difficult to predict, even for the federal government. The situation is further complicated by the peculiar stance of Sahra Wagenknecht, who has already stated her willingness to govern with the AfD should the latter fall a few percentage points short of an absolute majority in the regional parliament. In this regard, the only move the CDU might attempt to buy time and save the Brandmauer could be to appeal to the left (particularly the SPD and the Greens) to cast a ‘tactical vote’, urging them not to split their vote among parties close to or below the electoral threshold but instead to rally behind the Linke, with whom they could later form a government, but it is unlikely that the already sceptical centrist electorate would welcome seeing their candidate campaign on behalf of a former member of the SED, and the very real risk would be of driving even more votes towards the AfD, and not just in Saxony-Anhalt. Precisely to avoid losing votes to the right, Schulze continues to rule out any intention of collaborating with the Linke, although his stance will need to be assessed once the polls have closed.
The consequences at federal level
If a coalition government between the AfD and the CDU were indeed to materialise, the consequences in Berlin could be very serious – not only because the Brandmauer has, at least until now, been the implicit pact upon which eighty-one years of post-war Germany have been based, but also because of its implications for the very composition of the Bundestag. Whilst, on the one hand, there has always been a section of the CDU – particularly within its East German wing – willing to collaborate with the AfD, on the other hand, the majority remains made up of die-hards, closely aligned above all with the still-influential Angela Merkel, who would rather join forces with the heirs of Honecker and real socialism than govern alongside right-wing populists. The spectre, of which there is quiet talk in the offices on Klingelhöferstraße, is that of a split, whether it be the moderates who leave or the not inconsiderable number of those open to dialogue with the right. The government in Berlin would face a serious risk of losing its majority in the Bundestag, both due to the exodus of the centrists and the likely unwillingness of the SPD – itself in the depths of a crisis and never having recovered from the blow of the last federal elections – to co-govern with a party friendly to the right. All this whilst Germany is preparing, amid considerable controversy, to create Europe’s most powerful army, and whilst inflation is taking its toll on the lower and middle classes (+36 per cent for food, +124 per cent for heating oil, +94 per cent for gas, +36 per cent for electricity; data Statistisches Bundesamt) and whilst compulsory conscription is being debated following the resounding failure of the new voluntary recruitment scheme (530 enlistments out of an estimated 20,000). It is fairly easy to imagine the knock-on effects this could have on the European Union and its institutions.
[photo: Olaf2 CC 4.0 sa by]