In recent years, the European Commission has already managed to acquire ever-wider powers. Yet its ambition does not stop there. Whether the pretext is immigration, the war in Ukraine, trade tensions with China, the EU’s new long-term budget or the ‘post-Covid recovery fund’, the institutional reflex in Brussels remains the same: ‘more Europe’, more centralisation and more resources under the Commission’s control. The pattern is well known and, from the point of view of democratic accountability, deeply worrying.
Ceuta: never waste a good crisis
The chaotic border breach in the Spanish exclave of Ceuta, in North Africa, at the end of July 2026, provided the latest opportunity. Tens of thousands of migrants crossed the border from Morocco within a matter of days, overwhelming the small territory and sparking a heated political controversy across the European Union. Most of those who entered subsequently returned to Morocco, but several thousand remain, and Ceuta is now seeking to transfer around 1,000 ‘minors’ to mainland Spain.
In response, the leaders of twenty-two Member States published a strongly worded letter, clearly challenging the policies of Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez and his recent campaign to regularise the status of irregular migrants, which could ultimately benefit 3 million people.
In response, Italy even decided to temporarily suspend passport-free travel agreements with Spain, followed by Spanish retaliation in the form of border controls on flights from Italy to Spain. In subsequent reactions, EU Member States have softened their stance towards Spain, but the message had been sent. Sánchez’s mass regularisation “may not have been the sole trigger, but it was certainly a catalyst”, according to the Austrian Minister for European Affairs, Claudia Bauer.
Unlike the Member States, the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, praised Sánchez’s handling of the crisis, stating: ‘Both the Spanish and Moroccan authorities have managed the situation efficiently and effectively, successfully preventing illegal movements towards mainland Spain and Europe.’
She then immediately called for greater coordination at EU level and an increase in the Union’s spending on migration, stating: ‘Migration is a European challenge that requires a European response.’ In particular, he went on to advocate “vigilant monitoring and the use of physical barriers where necessary”, early-warning systems and greater technical and financial support for Morocco, which could raise some concerns amongst those who believe that Morocco is actively or passively involved in this affair. The European Commission has also proposed to “increase support for Spain”, as well as the deployment to Spain of a greater number of members of Frontex, the EU’s border agency.
French MEP Fabrice Leggeri (RN), former head of the European border agency Frontex, responded: “The European Union is once again trotting out its usual repertoire. More Frontex, more resources, more procedures. (…) What has never been lacking is money. What is lacking is the political will to enforce our borders.” So far, however, even the left-wing Spanish government has refused to request an increase in the Frontex presence in Spain, insisting that border control falls under the jurisdiction of national authorities. After all, ‘never waste a good crisis’ is a tried-and-tested strategy of the European Commission for pushing its agenda forward.
EU demands for ‘own resources’ – EU taxes in all but name
The Covid crisis presented a major opportunity for the European Commission to acquire greater powers. Not only was the European Commission entrusted with the task of negotiating the joint procurement of vaccines, but EU leaders also agreed on a massive new EU fund, financed by jointly issued EU debt. This ‘Post-Covid Recovery Fund’, worth 800 billion euros, has been marred by fraud and improper spending.
The EU Court of Auditors, the Union’s internal financial control body, has severely criticised the programme’s lack of transparency in a report. Ivana Maletić, a member of the Croatian Court of Auditors, even described the way the funds were spent as ‘utterly absurd’, stating: ‘EU policymakers should not authorise instruments of this kind in future unless they first have information on the actual costs and the final recipients. They must also have a clear answer to the question of what citizens actually get in return for their money.’
None of this has quenched the European Commission’s thirst for money. For the EU’s new long-term budget for 2028–2034, it is exerting strong pressure to secure new ‘own resources’: duties on tobacco, electronic waste and companies, alongside revenue linked to ‘carbon’ pricing and greenhouse gas emissions. In the spring, the European Parliament proposed, in a rather unconstructive manner, three further new EU taxes: on online gambling, on cryptocurrency firms and on digital companies. Last month, the Irish Ambassador to the EU met with his counterparts to assess which of the eight taxes under discussion enjoyed the most support. Meanwhile, the idea of a levy on sugar has also been mooted
From the moment it was proposed, Sweden has strongly opposed the proposed tobacco tax, which would channel at least €11.2 billion a year into the EU budget. In July 2025, the Swedish Finance Minister, Elisabeth Svantesson, described it as ‘completely unacceptable’.
The specific concern in this case was that the Commission intended to subject not only conventional tobacco products but also low-risk nicotine alternatives to significantly higher minimum excise duties, thereby ignoring the markedly different health impacts of the products in question. A similar, ill-targeted approach is also evident in the revision of the Tobacco Products Directive (TPD), which concerns the regulation of such nicotine-based alternatives.
It is significant that over 90 per cent of the responses received in the Commission’s consultation on this specific policy revision raised substantial objections to the direction proposed by the Commission. Only around two per cent of the responses recorded openly support a more restrictive approach. Ninety-six per cent of contributions from the academic and research communities were opposed to the proposed direction.
Despite this, the Commission is simply pressing ahead with preparing the new legislative framework. It is clear that consultations of this kind represent inconvenient obstacles to the agenda that has already been set.
The other proposed taxes are also facing opposition. Poland and Italy have strongly opposed the EU ‘carbon’ tax, which is hardly surprising given their criticism of the EU’s long-standing ‘Emissions Trading Scheme’ (ETS), which they rightly regard as a significant burden on European competitiveness.
Germany and other governments have sharply criticised the idea of an EU corporate tax, the so-called ‘Corporate Resource for Europe’ (CORE). This appears to have had some effect, as it emerged at the end of July that the Commission is now considering mitigating its impact by reducing the number of companies that would be subject to it. Politico quotes a European diplomat who reflects on the fact that the levy would, in that case, generate negligible revenue, asking: ‘Is it worth it?’ This line of reasoning misses the point. Undoubtedly, the European Commission believes that, once such a tax regime is established at EU level, it could be extended.
Defence procurement and the war in Ukraine
In the defence sector, too, the European Commission has acquired considerable powers in recent years. Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine has laid bare Europe’s chronic underinvestment and industrial fragmentation. Thanks to instruments such as the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP), the Act on Strengthening the European Defence Industry through Joint Procurement (EDIRPA), the European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) of 2024 and the subsequent European Defence Industrial Programme, the EU’s role in the defence sector – and therefore that of the Commission – has been significantly expanded.
One of the targets set for 2030 is that 50 per cent of defence procurement budgets and at least 40 per cent of military equipment contracts should be awarded through collaboration.
Ironically, the European Peace Fund (EPF), an off-budget fund of over 17 billion euros created in 2021, has ended up becoming a mechanism for reimbursing Member States that send lethal weapons, ammunition and military equipment to war zones such as Ukraine.
Last but not least, there is the EU’s SAFE lending facility, approved in 2025 with a budget of 150 billion euros. This enables the Commission to raise funds on international markets and lend them to Member States for investment in the defence sector, including support for Ukraine. This entails a further increase in debt issued jointly by the EU.
What began as emergency coordination has evolved into a structural increase in the EU’s influence over military procurement and industrial policy – areas long regarded as core national competences.
Whilst greater European cooperation on defence is, in principle, welcomed, the Commission’s growing budgetary and regulatory footprint raises legitimate questions regarding democratic oversight and national sovereignty.
Furthermore, questions are being raised as to whether the EU’s action on defence might hinder NATO. In his farewell speech in 2024, former NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg warned that European countries should avoid ‘duplicating’ NATO’s defence efforts with EU initiatives. At that time, senior NATO officials complained that the EU’s defence efforts were already diverting resources away from existing NATO structures. One example of this is the fact that NATO has its own NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA), based in Luxembourg, which serves as the Alliance’s main hub for joint multinational procurement.
Trade defence and the Chinese challenge
Last but not least, the European Commission has also acquired all manner of new powers to respond to trade disputes. A key development in this context was the way in which China exerted pressure on Lithuania in 2021 through a severe campaign of diplomatic downgrading and informal economic coercion, in response to the country’s diplomatic stance towards Taiwan. The World Trade Organisation (WTO) offered little in the way of a solution for Lithuania.
One response to this is the EU’s Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI), adopted in 2023 and often described as the EU’s ‘trade bazooka’. It grants the Commission broad powers to propose all manner of retaliatory measures: from restrictions on imports and exports to limits on public procurement, services, investment and the protection of intellectual property. This does, however, require the agreement of the EU Member States, but within the decision-making process set out by the ACI, the ability of individual Member States or the European Parliament to block action is limited.
Other new developments include the International Procurement Instrument, adopted in 2022, and the Regulation on Foreign Subsidies. An ‘instrument against overcapacity’ is also being developed, which has already prompted threats of retaliation from China.
All this comes on top of the European Commission’s traditional powers, such as the right to impose anti-dumping duties, anti-subsidy measures and safeguard measures. By the end of 2025, the Commission had implemented more than 170 measures of this kind, the vast majority of which were directed at Chinese exporters, such as the additional duties of up to 35.3 per cent on Chinese electric vehicles.
There are certainly legitimate concerns about unfair competition and pressure, but when it comes to protectionism, the EU is not exactly innocent, and none of this should divert attention from the dangers associated with the resulting centralisation of power.
