We’ve finally reached the final stretch: Hungary’s most hotly contested election campaign ever will come to a close in less than a week, at 7:00 p.m. on Sunday, April 12, when polls close across Hungary and the vote count begins to reveal whether Viktor Orbán will be re-elected as Prime Minister for the fifth consecutive term and the sixth overall. We spoke with Mihályi Rosonczy-Kovács, Director of Foreign Affairs at the Nézőpont Institute in Budapest.
For Orbán, the toughest week begins
As previously reported in other articles by the Foundation, Hungary is emerging from a long period of political stability. Regardless of one’s political views, the current Prime Minister has shaped the image of contemporary Hungary, governing the country with an economic agenda rooted in liberalism and a values-based agenda grounded in Christian conservatism; the Fundamental Law (Magyarország Alaptörvénye) itself, which serves as the Constitution and was enacted by the Orbán II government in 2012, constitutes the first true constitutional charter of democratic Hungary, as the previous charter, despite being amended and “democratized” several times, remained Europe’s last communist-inspired constitution (it had in fact been imposed in 1949—inspired by the 1936 Soviet constitution and with Stalin’s consent—by the country’s first pro-Soviet leader, Prime Minister István Dobi). The significance of the upcoming election, unusual for a country with fewer than ten million inhabitants, can be gauged by the intense media coverage of the event, which has extended far beyond Hungary’s borders. Orbán’s pragmatic agenda, based on criteria of pure and exclusive national interest, has led the country toward a policy of cooperation with Donald Trump’s United States, Vladimir Putin’s Russia, and Xi Jinping’s China (the latter having become the leading foreign investor in the country, surpassing Germany in 2020).
The Geopolitical Game
Hungary’s gradual rapprochement with the European Union’s three main competitors—economically (the United States and China) and geopolitically (the United States and Russia)—has led to a gradual cooling of relations with Brussels, which is viewed more as a source of problematic overregulation and interference in national affairs than as a community of friendly states dedicated to mutual support. Orbán’s unusual approach to EU membership—based on an attempt to maximize its benefits without ceding any Hungarian national sovereignty—has proven successful in economic and geopolitical terms, significantly increasing Budapest’s diplomatic clout in European forums. Yet it has simultaneously placed the country at the center of constant crossfire from the vast majority of European capitals (Paris and Berlin first and foremost), which have repeatedly sought to impose sanctions on the country and actively worked to support the opposition to Fidesz both in Hungary and abroad.
The point of no return, dating back to 2022—the year of the Russian invasion of Ukraine—is Budapest’s obstructive stance toward every single package of EU sanctions against Moscow, as well as the decision, shared with Robert Fico’s Slovakia, not to give up Russian gas and energy (both landlocked countries would be significantly penalized by such a measure). The accusation leveled at Hungary—coming from Brussels and Kyiv, but also from London—is that it is “playing into Putin’s hands.” Orbán, according to this narrative, is essentially a thorn in the EU’s side, preventing it from aiding Ukraine with the speed it needs to triumph in the long war that has been dragging on wearily in its eastern and southern regions for four years now. It should therefore come as no surprise that Brussels views Orbán’s challenger with great favor— namely Péter Magyar, who, having stormed out of Fidesz, decided to become its main opponent, taking with him a number of defectors and disillusioned members, and placing himself at the helm—thanks to numerous non-interference agreements with other political forces—of the Tisza Alliance, a moderate right-wing party affiliated with the EPP and currently the only truly credible opponent of the incumbent Prime Minister. With Orbán no longer in Budapest—this is the hope circulating in Brussels, Paris, and Berlin—the European Union will finally be able to unleash its full geopolitical offensive potential, depriving its adversaries (Putin, but also Trump) of a valuable “fifth column.”
A Strong Prime Minister
Adding to the importance of this election cycle is the structure of the Hungarian political system; although Hungary is a parliamentary republic, the Fundamental Law grants the Prime Minister powers that effectively make it a semi-presidential republic, where, however, the President of the Republic (currently Tamás Sulyok) has merely ceremonial and guarantor functions. Unlike in Italy, where the President of the Republic (who is not elected by the people) can serve as a very strong counterweight to the Prime Minister, in Hungary the Prime Minister wields significantly greater influence than the occupants of Palazzo Chigi, making the current Prime Minister’s personal opinions and policies highly influential. The obvious downside of such significant power held by the head of government is that he is held responsible for all the country’s problems, even those not immediately attributable to the government. Orbán’s fifth administration, now in its final stages, is certainly grappling with the most tense geopolitical climate of the past forty years: with a war involving a direct neighbor (Ukraine) and hostility from many European Union countries, as well as from the Union itself, compounded in the last two years by a certain level of inflation (due to Middle Eastern energy shocks) that, especially in cities, is beginning to erode the purchasing power of the middle classes and the urban bourgeoisie.
Péter Magyar, Populism, and External Influences
Against a backdrop of progressive and growing economic difficulties (which, in truth, affect the entire European continent and not just Hungary), the invectives of Péter Magyar have found fertile ground. Despite his party’s centrist affiliation, these invectives have been marked from the outset by strong populist overtones, accusing the government and the Prime Minister of corruption and kleptocracy, though he has never provided convincing evidence to support these accusations. While Hungary remains a socially united country with low political conflict, the current election campaign has certainly been the most bitter ever held in this Central European nation. Péter Magyar, in particular, has repeatedly leveled extremely serious accusations not only against the government but also against the broad segment of Hungarian society (including the press) that still supports it and intends to reaffirm its confidence in it. The two large rallies held simultaneously on March 15 in Budapest—with Fidesz in Kossuth Square and TISZA in Heroes’ Square (180,000 and 150,000 participants respectively—enormous numbers given the country’s size)—though they took place peacefully and without any incidents between the two sides—can give an idea of how decisively Sunday’s contest is perceived by both sides, and it is no surprise that TISZA’s most successful slogan is precisely “Most vagy soha!” (Now or never!). Exacerbating the electoral climate, in addition to domestic scandals—such as the video allegedly showing Péter Magyar participating in an ambiguous party where cocaine was consumed in the company of several escorts—have been external influences, including not-so-veiled threats against the Prime Minister and his family from Ukrainian figures close to the Kiev government, such as those by General Hryhoriy Omelchenko, which have resonated widely in Hungary and even led Péter Magyar himself to declare that “No foreign leader can threaten any Hungarian citizen.”
According to Rosonczy-Kovács
“External influence is a very important issue, and it proved to be so already during the last elections. Since then, following the change of government in the United States, we have seen the influence of the USAID fund, demonstrated in black and white through its funding of NGOs that, under the guise of noble causes, have pursued a policy against the government. Now this system, previously based on the two pillars of Washington and Brussels, can rely solely on Brussels. To this must be added Ukrainian influence, as we saw in Poland in 2023, where despite the government [of Mateusz Morawiecki, ed.] being the one that had helped Ukraine the most, in the end President Zelensky waged a campaign almost directly against them to ensure the victory of Donald Tusk, who is part of the EPP.”
The terrorism alert and fears of war
In this context, Hungarian intelligence services have raised the alert level several times, particularly regarding the security of energy infrastructure, whose surveillance—entrusted directly to the armed forces—has been significantly strengthened in recent months. Confirming the validity of these alerts is the very recent news of the discovery of large quantities of explosives near the TurkStream gas pipeline connecting Serbia to Hungary, reported to the Hungarian government by Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić. In response, the Hungarian government held an emergency meeting on the afternoon of Easter Sunday to strengthen security and counterterrorism measures in the country. In such a tense geopolitical context, it is clear that even the most pressing domestic issues (inflation, pensions, healthcare, etc.) have taken a back seat. In this context, Orbán has succeeded in making geopolitics the central theme of the election campaign—an area where he enjoys the support of a large portion of the Hungarian electorate, most of whom oppose any form of support for Ukraine as well as any involvement in a world war that, rightly or wrongly, is increasingly perceived in Hungary as inevitable. This political move—to stake everything on a “pacifist” and populist platform—forced Magyar onto the defensive, leading him to declare that even in the event of a TISZA victory, Budapest’s stance toward Zelensky and Ukraine would not change: bold statements that, while not appreciated by Brussels, helped politically parry the blow dealt by the outgoing administration. Magyar, for his part, forced to hold together a diverse array of voters with very different views (liberals, disillusioned conservatives, socialists, environmentalists, and the radical left), responds by continually trying to bring the discussion back within national borders, calling on the government to answer for its alleged corruption.
The Double-Edged Sword of Polls
In such a tense climate, where even polls can become a shield and a sword for one political side or the other, they take on a particular significance. Hungary, in particular, is one of the countries where the forces opposing the sovereignists are most overestimated by the majority of pollsters. In this regard, it is worth recalling that during the 2022 elections, most polling firms—both Hungarian and foreign—agreed that the race between Orbán and his challenger Péter Márki-Zay was essentially tied (or, at most, showed a slight lead for Fidesz), while the latter was defeated by the former by a margin of as much as twenty percentage points. According to the latest polls conducted by the Nézőpont Intézet and reported to us by Rosonczy-Kovács: “the most likely outcome is 46% for Fidesz, 40% for Tisza, and 8% for Mi Hazánk, while the Demokratikus Koalíció and the Two-Tailed Dog Party still have hopes of entering Parliament and clearing the electoral threshold.” The numerous polls conducted by institutes close to the opposition, which give TISZA a lead of 10, 12, and even 15 points, are intended, according to Rosonczy-Kovács, to “fuel hope for a possible change (a strategy already used in the United States and Poland), both among voters and international allies, starting with the European People’s Party, which has invested heavily in TISZA.”