The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the recent conflict in the Persian Gulf have highlighted the growing role of so-called “kamikaze drones.” These weapon systems, initially conceived as tools for asymmetric countermeasures against a potential adversary’s conventional superiority, are now at the center of a rapid evolutionary process that is profoundly transforming their function, methods of use, and impact on the battlefield.
From the First Loitering Munitions to the Conflict in Karabakh
The first attempts to use unmanned weapon systems to strike enemy defenses date back to World War I. The United States, in fact, sought to develop the project for an unmanned aircraft known as the Kettering Bug. This platform offered numerous advantages, such as the absence of pilots—which prevented personnel losses—reduced production costs, and a highly simplified manufacturing process. However, the end of the war and cuts to military research funding led to the project’s termination. The need to develop a weapon system with the characteristics of the Bug resurfaced in the 1980s in the State of Israel. During the Yom Kippur War, the Israeli armed forces had in fact suffered heavy losses due to Soviet anti-aircraft systems. These systems represented a significant obstacle to the implementation of Israeli military doctrine aimed at rapidly achieving air superiority in order to destroy as many enemy systems as possible in the shortest time possible. The Israeli armed forces therefore began to develop a platform capable of combining the advantages of an unmanned system with the low costs of a single-use munition to carry out enemy air defense suppression (SEAD/DEAD) missions
This process culminated in the introduction into service of the IAI Harpy, the first example of a “loitering munition” equipped with an explosive warhead. The term “loitering munition” refers to a weapon system capable of “loitering”—patrolling a specific area while simultaneously performing ISR and strike functions—and crashing into selected enemy targets during flight. Their versatility, low cost, and ease of production made Israeli loitering munitions a significant asset for Israeli military exports. In 2020, during the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, Israeli Harop loitering munitions were successfully deployed by the Azerbaijani armed forces to destroy enemy air defenses.
From Precision to Saturation
As a consequence of the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the subsequent Iran-Iraq War, the Iranian armed forces lost much of their conventional power. The severing of military ties with the United States made it impossible to replace the modern American-made weapon systems previously in service with the Shah’s army, which were lost during the devastating conflict with Baghdad. This state of affairs led to a profound reshaping of Iran’s military posture, marked by the increased prominence of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The need to counter the actions of actors significantly superior in symmetric military terms with limited resources resulted in the adoption of a posture centered on the use of asymmetric tools. This situation led Iran to modify the concept behind Israeli loitering munitions, adapting it to its own strategic needs.
Iranian forces then began to develop single-use drones significantly larger than their Israeli counterparts and equipped with significantly heavier explosive warheads. The result was the production of the first One Way Attack Drones (OWA). Unlike loitering munitions, OWAs do not perform a hovering flight to select a target but instead strike predetermined targets by following a pre-set flight path using GPS coordinates. The Iranian Shaheds have represented a genuine cost-effective alternative to a cruise missile, capable—thanks to their low cost and simplicity of production—of serving as a “saturator” of enemy air defenses, forcing the adversary to engage at an unfavorable opportunity cost. These drones are capable of inflicting heavy damage both by crashing directly into enemy targets and by drawing the fire of air defenses, thereby clearing the way for the impact of more powerful systems such as ballistic missiles.
The development of the Iranian Shaheds marked the emergence of a new category of weapons distinct from loitering munitions. Although the latter are also, in effect, one-way attack drones, they perform purely tactical missions, leveraging their great versatility. Conversely, OWA drones carry out strategic missions, striking enemy assets and infrastructure, thereby depleting their ammunition reserves.
Ukraine, the Modern Testing Ground
The Russian invasion of Ukraine has seen an unprecedented use of unmanned systems. Ukraine, much like Iran, has in fact made massive use of drones as an asymmetric tool aimed at countering Russia’s overwhelming conventional superiority. Kyiv has in fact developed a powerful production ecosystem consisting of hundreds of companies, startups, and volunteer initiatives focused on adapting off-the-shelf solutions and on top-down platform innovation. In particular, Kyiv has revolutionized the use of loitering munitions by using four-motor FVP drones equipped with explosive warheads. The massive use of FVPs has made it possible to maximize the traditional strengths of loitering munitions—low costs, simplicity of the production process, and high versatility—allowing even the conventionally weaker contender to wage a “mass” war. The large-scale production of FVP drones has provided Ukraine with both tools capable of ensuring constant battlefield awareness and extremely cost-effective means of inflicting significant damage on enemy forces. The use of FVP drones as loitering munitions reached its peak during Operation Spider Web, which inflicted significant damage on the Russian strategic bomber fleet using these systems, which were equipped with artificial intelligence for the occasion.
The Ukrainian armed forces have also made extensive use of OWA drones to compensate for the limited availability of long-range missile systems and overcome the disadvantage posed by Russia’s greater strategic depth. The vastness of Moscow’s territory has, in fact, allowed it to maintain numerous important assets—such as military bases and production facilities—far from the front lines. Ukraine has therefore deployed UAVs as a cost-effective alternative to long-range missile systems, using them to strike military bases and production assets far from the front lines. With regard to UAVs, the greatest innovation carried out by Ukrainian forces has been their deployment in a new domain: the maritime domain. Ukraine has, in fact, equipped surface drones (USVs) and underwater drones (UUVs) with explosive warheads, transforming them into UAVs suitable for maritime warfare. The use of UAVs, commonly known as “naval drones,” has in fact allowed Kiev’s forces to wage a full-fledged asymmetric naval war, neutralizing the superior conventional capabilities of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. In this context, the evolution of Ukrainian naval UAVs has reached the point of equipping them with missile systems designed to counter potential aerial threats. The downing of an aircraft by a Magura V5 drone marked a new era in the history of UAVs, which are now conceived as platforms capable of damaging enemy assets not only through their own impact but also through the use of weapon systems mounted on them
The Third Gulf War
On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched a massive bombing campaign against Iran, striking strategic targets and killing numerous high-profile figures of the Islamic Republic, including the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei. The operation represented a significant tactical success, aimed at decapitating Iran’s political-military leadership and undermining its decision-making capabilities. Tehran responded with a massive retaliatory campaign, based on the combined use of swarms of One Way Attack (OWA) drones and ballistic missiles. The conflict thus unequivocally highlighted the strategic maturation of unmanned systems. Iranian drones proved capable of performing a variety of functions: from saturating air defenses to directly attacking critical infrastructure, to serving as “pathfinders” for more sophisticated weapon systems, such as ballistic and cruise missiles.
The strategy adopted by Tehran has forced the United States and its allies to operate under structurally unfavorable conditions. The use of advanced interceptor systems, such as Patriot and Arrow, to neutralize significantly less expensive platforms has, in fact, resulted in a highly unbalanced cost-benefit ratio. Added to this is the intrinsic risk posed by potential breaches of defenses: even a limited number of drones capable of striking strategic infrastructure can produce economic and operational effects disproportionate to the cost of the platforms deployed. In this context, the saturation of defenses has allowed Iranian forces to deploy more powerful delivery systems more effectively, amplifying the damage inflicted on enemy assets. At the same time, Tehran has expanded the use of unmanned systems to the maritime domain as well, employing aerial and naval drones to threaten the safety of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. This dynamic has contributed to a significant increase in crude oil prices, demonstrating Iran’s ability to translate relatively inexpensive military tools into levers of global economic pressure.
Toward Hybrid Systems
The operational evolution of loitering munitions and OWAs has progressively highlighted the intrinsic limitations of both categories, paving the way for the development of hybrid platforms aimed at overcoming their main vulnerabilities. The Turkish industry, particularly the company Baykar, is active in this direction, having recently introduced a new system known as K2. This platform represents a significant attempt at technological convergence, combining elements typical of loitering munitions with characteristics specific to UAVs. The K2, in fact, integrates a high-capacity warhead, in the range of 200 kg, and an extended operational range, characteristics that bring it closer to UAVs and allow its use against strategic targets. At the same time, the presence of a landing gear introduces a departure from “disposable” systems, making it possible to recover and reuse the platform. Operationally, the system is equipped with advanced navigation and target identification capabilities based on artificial intelligence. This allows the aircraft to autonomously select targets, while maintaining the flexibility typical of loitering munitions. At the same time, the integration of these systems helps mitigate the effects of jamming, allowing the drone to operate even in highly contested electromagnetic environments, where the link with the control station may be compromised. More generally, the emergence of hybrid platforms signals a structural trend: the gradual dissolution of traditional distinctions between ISR systems and strike systems, in favor of integrated, autonomous, and multifunctional solutions.
Initially conceived as tools of asymmetric warfare, loitering munitions and UAVs have rapidly established themselves as central components of contemporary warfare. Their combination of versatility, scalability, and cost-effectiveness has enabled even actors with limited resources to inflict significant damage on conventionally superior forces, helping to redefine military and geopolitical balances on a global scale. However, the effectiveness of these systems lies not solely in the technology itself, but in the ability to sustain their large-scale deployment. The high level of attrition that characterizes contemporary conflicts requires, in fact, an industrial ecosystem capable of ensuring mass production, rapid adaptation, and continuous innovation. At the same time, the speed of technological progress demands constant investment in research and development to counter the rapid obsolescence of platforms and maintain an operational advantage. In this context, drones represent not merely an evolution of military tools, but a deeper transformation of the very way war is conceived: from a confrontation between complex and costly platforms to a competition between distributed, adaptive, and increasingly autonomous systems. Those actors capable of integrating production, innovation, and operational doctrine within this new paradigm will enjoy a significant strategic advantage in the long term.
Photo: A Shahed drone. Mehr News Agency cc 4.0 sa by