Over the past five years, jihadism in Europe has taken on a fragmented form, characterized by lone actors and micro-networks, while in the Sahel it remains territorial in nature.
DOWNLOAD THE DOSSIER
Between 2022 and 2026, jihadism took on seemingly divergent forms. In Europe, lone actors, micro-networks, and small cells have gained increasing prominence in ecosystems where propaganda, digital communities, and transnational connections can support mobilization even without continuous organizational leadership. In the Sahel, during the same period, JNIM and groups linked to the Islamic State have maintained or expanded their territorial, military, and economic capabilities.
This apparent contradiction suggests moving beyond a linear interpretation of jihadist evolution. The individual, the micro-network, the organization, the territory, and the infosphere do not necessarily constitute successive phases, but rather strategic scales that can be combined depending on the operational environment. The “granular threat” describes a specific configuration of this geometry: action can emerge through small, low-visibility units, while maintaining varying levels of ideological, relational, or organizational connection with broader ecosystems.
A comparison between Europe and the Sahel thus shows that a reduction in operational scale does not coincide with the disappearance of the organization. In Europe, the organization may distance itself from the actor and perform narrative, identity-building, or facilitating functions; in the Sahel, however, it may manifest itself through armed structures, control or contestation of space, resources, and discontinuous and adaptive forms of governance.
The infosphere constitutes the connective dimension of the model, but it is not an autonomous cause of violence. The sources demonstrate capacities for amplification, connection, and acceleration, without allowing us to attribute to algorithms or platforms an autonomous and sufficient causal role in the transition to mobilization. Even geopolitical crises such as the war in Gaza can act as triggers and framing devices, accelerating already existing trajectories.
For Italy, the main implication concerns the possible convergence between internal operational autonomy and transnational connections. Early warning should therefore focus less on individual indicators and more on the convergence of content, relationships, capabilities, and targets, as well as on the speed with which these elements lead to action.