India’s Comeback

Key Takeaways

India no longer sees itself as just an emerging power, but as an indispensable player that wants to reshape the world order and secure a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.
Even though it is a continent-sized nation marked by deep linguistic, religious, and social diversity, it is growing rapidly (around 7% a year) and practices strategic autonomy by working with the United States, Russia, China, and others without fully aligning with any one side.
Its ambition, however, still depends on its ability to turn demographic and economic weight into lasting internal cohesion and real global influence.

The new Asian power wants to reshape the world order. And a seat on the Security Council

There is a country that takes little comfort in finding itself among those not yet counted among the emerging powers. A country that looks at the tables of international diplomacy and wonders why the world order must continue to reflect the balances of another era. That country is India: a continent-sized nation, crisscrossed by different languages, religions, and identities, capable of holding together millennia-old traditions and technological ambitions, persistent poverty, and urban centers projected into the future. A giant that asks not only to grow, but to be recognized and acknowledged for what it has become and for the role it intends to play.

Its rise raises a question destined to weigh on the balance of power in the Third Millennium: Can the world continue to be governed according to the political hierarchies of the post-World War II era, when the distribution of wealth, population, and power has undergone an almost fundamental transformation? The Indian government and a large portion of its population disagree. And, above all, they no longer seem willing to accept that fundamental decisions are made without their adequate participatory involvement.

One Nation, a Thousand Identities

To understand India’s ambition, however, one must start with its contradictions. India is not a homogeneous country, nor could it ever be. It is a vast federation in which different linguistic, cultural, and religious identities coexist. The Constitution recognizes 22 languages in the Eighth Schedule, while the linguistic reality of the subcontinent is far more complex. Hindi and English play central roles at the federal level, but in many states, regional languages serve as the primary framework for public life and collective identity.

From Tamil to Bengali, from Marathi to Telugu, from Punjabi to Malayalam, each language preserves its own history, literature, and cultural heritage. These differences are not merely folkloric details: they influence politics, education, relations between the center and the periphery, and the very concept of nationhood. Indian unity does not stem from the absence of diversity, but from the need to manage it.

Added to this complexity is religious diversity. The Hindu majority coexists with one of the world’s largest Muslim populations, as well as with Christian, Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, and other communities. This mosaic has contributed to the richness of Indian civilization, but it is also marked by tensions and conflicts.

In recent years, the relationship between Hindu nationalism, national identity, and the protection of minorities has become one of the most hotly debated issues in political life. The project of building a more cohesive national consciousness can fuel mobilization and consensus; but at the same time, it raises questions about the state’s ability to fully guarantee the pluralism that has characterized its constitutional history.

This is where the first strategic challenge lies: transforming a potentially divisive plurality into a political asset, without allowing unity to result in the homogenization of differences.

Growth and the Weight of Numbers

India has a considerable demographic advantage. Its population, the vastness of its domestic market, and a young workforce constitute an important foundation for economic development. But numbers alone do not produce power: they must be accompanied by productivity, infrastructure, education, and the ability to create jobs.

The economic trajectory, however, offers significant promise. In its update published in early October 2026, the World Bank forecasts 7.1% growth for India in fiscal year 2026–2027, driven by domestic demand and exports. The organization also highlights the country’s potential in the field of artificial intelligence, thanks to the availability of technical expertise, the presence of an IT sector integrated into global markets, and the development of digital infrastructure. The Indian system is no longer limited to providing IT services. The country aims to strengthen manufacturing, pharmaceutical production, infrastructure, the space industry, and technological capabilities applied to security and defense. The Chandrayaan-3 lunar mission, which concluded in 2023 with a successful moon landing, brought international attention to a space program that combines scientific research, national ambition, and relatively low costs.

However, the transformation is not yet complete. Growth in gross domestic product does not automatically translate into a uniform improvement in living standards. Employment, the quality of education, women’s participation in the labor market, regional inequalities, and the persistence of large economic segments remain critical issues.

India’s challenge is therefore twofold: to convert economic expansion into widespread well-being and, at the same time, to transform it into international influence. For while a large economy can attract investment and partners, a great power must also be able to sustain its ambitions over time.

Strategic Autonomy: The Indian Lesson

It is above all in the realm of foreign policy that India asserts a unique position. Its key concept is strategic autonomy: the ability to cooperate with various partners without surrendering full control of its own decisions to any single one.

Relations with the United States have strengthened in areas such as technology, defense, and Indo-Pacific security. Washington views India as a key partner in counterbalancing Chinese influence in Asia. But New Delhi has no intention of turning this convergence into political subordination. Cooperation serves Indian interests; it is not the result of unconditional adherence to U.S. strategy.

This is also demonstrated by India’s relations with Moscow, which are underpinned by a long history of military and energy cooperation. Despite Western pressure following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, India has maintained important ties with Russia, including those related to energy supplies. This choice reflects economic and security interests, but it also entails diplomatic commitments and the need to manage complex relationships with Western partners.

With China, the situation is even more delicate. The two powers share commercial interests and participate in common multilateral forums, but they are also strategic competitors. Territorial disputes in the Himalayas, the military balance along the border, and competition for influence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean continue to fuel a structural rivalry.

In essence, India seeks to avoid a binary choice between Washington and Beijing, between the West and the Eurasian bloc. It participates in the BRICS, the G20, and the Quad, keeping various diplomatic channels open. This flexibility allows it to negotiate on multiple fronts, but it does not eliminate contradictions: every partnership involves expectations, pressures, and limitations.

This is not neutrality in the classical sense of the term, nor is it permanent equidistance. It is an attempt to preserve the maximum margin for decision-making in an increasingly complex and competitive international system.

The Five Permanent Members and the Issue of Representation

India’s claim also concerns the world’s institutional architecture. In the United Nations Security Council, the five permanent members—the United States, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom—hold veto power over substantive decisions. This structure reflects the balance of power that emerged from World War II, not that of the current distribution of political, economic, and military power.

India considers this configuration increasingly unrepresentative. Its population, the growing weight of its economy, its regional role, and its nuclear capabilities all fuel the demand for a revision that would grant it a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. The Indian government has long maintained that the legitimacy of multilateral institutions also depends on their ability to include actors that have acquired decisive influence.

The issue goes beyond national ambition. It concerns the credibility of an international system in which a significant portion of humanity is imperfectly represented in the forums where decisions on peace and security are made.

The path ahead remains difficult, however. Reforming the Security Council requires broad political agreement and overcoming divergent interests among member states. India’s candidacy is therefore by no means a foregone conclusion. And the demand for a more prominent role does not automatically resolve the problem of how to exercise it.

It is precisely this gap between actual influence and formal recognition that explains part of New Delhi’s international stance: India not only wants to be consulted but also insists on having a say in decisions. It does not merely aspire to join the club of the powerful but intends to help redefine its rules.

The Power and Its Contradictions

One essential question remains: To what extent will India be able to sustain this ambition? Its development is not without obstacles. Social disparities, regional differences, religious tensions, and labor market challenges can affect internal stability and the capacity for external projection.

The relationship between democracy and nationalism also serves as a litmus test. India continues to be an electoral democracy of exceptional scale, with intense political competition and a vibrant civil society. At the same time, observers and international organizations have expressed concerns about media freedom, the conditions of minorities, and the space available for dissent. Any assessment of the political system must take these tensions into account, without reducing India’s complexity to a single-dimensional judgment.

Indeed, a global power is not measured solely by its ability to grow, arm itself, or sit at diplomatic tables; the quality of its institutions, the strength of its social contract, and its ability to manage differences without turning them into permanent divisions also matter.

India faces a historic challenge: to demonstrate that international ambition can go hand in hand with internal cohesion, that economic modernization can translate into concrete opportunities, and that cultural diversity can coexist with a shared national project.

No Longer an “Emerging Power”

India is not yet capable of determining the global balance of power on its own, nor is it immune to the vulnerabilities that characterize large, transforming economies. But it can no longer be viewed merely as a promise for the future. It is already an indispensable player on the global stage: from Indo-Pacific security to global value chains, from the energy transition to technological governance.

What sets India apart is its desire to wield this influence without accepting exclusive political dependence. New Delhi does not intend to choose once and for all which camp to belong to; it prefers to weave a network of solid, differentiated relationships, capitalize on its geographic position, and exploit competition among the major powers to expand its room for maneuver.

It is an ambitious strategy, fraught with risks and compromises. Its success will depend on India’s ability to convert its demographic and economic potential into lasting results, on its management of regional tensions, and on the credibility of its domestic institutions.

Meanwhile, the world is forced to come to terms with a reality that diplomacy can no longer ignore. Power no longer coincides solely with the status quo that the victorious powers established after 1945; its geography has expanded, its centers have multiplied, and hierarchies have become more difficult to maintain.

India, therefore, wants to be a part of this transformation—not a mere extra or spectator. And its ambition, regardless of the results it manages to achieve, raises a question that is bound to remain open: if the 21st century is truly to be a multipolar century, the world’s institutions and rules will have to reflect a distribution of power different from that of the past.

For New Delhi, the issue is no longer about having to prove that it has become a major power, but rather about having that achievement—and everything associated with this new status—recognized.

[Photo by Rishi Nikam, CC 4.0 SA BY]

Note: The opinion expressed in the articles are those of the respective authors and may not reflect the views of the Machiavelli Foundation.

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