War from the Grassroots: Deterrence, Decentralization, and Strategic Adaptation in the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict (2022–2026)

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The Russian-Ukrainian conflict (2022–2026) is the primary testing ground for digital warfare and a severe test of strategic theory. The classics (Clausewitz, Schelling, Kahn) remain valid but need to be updated: the battlefield is more transparent, and the tactical level is more influential. Deterrence is fragmented, and NATO has primarily relied on “indirect denial” through arms supplies to Ukraine. Escalation is no longer linear, and strategy emerges from the bottom up, from decentralized tactical realities. For Italy and NATO, maintaining the old command structures and military culture would create a structural disadvantage.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • The Russian-Ukrainian conflict (2022–2026) is one of the principal empirical laboratories of digitized warfare in the 21st century, and perhaps the most severe testing ground that strategic theory has faced since the end of the Cold War.
  • The theoretical pillars of classical strategic stability—Clausewitz, Schelling, Kahn—have not been superseded, but their theses require careful reworking. The battlefield has become more transparent, centralized commands are more vulnerable, and factors at the tactical level can exert greater influence on strategic outcomes than in the past.
  • Deterrence is no longer a unitary mechanism but a fragmented process that operates differently across the conventional, hybrid, nuclear, and informational domains. Within this framework, the shift from deterrence by punishment to indirect deterrence by denial—the model through which NATO has supported Ukraine via the progressive supply of weapon systems—represents a mechanism that classical literature has largely left unexamined.
  • Escalation no longer follows the linear progression of Kahn’s ladder; a four-type model is proposed to capture dynamics that intertwine across different domains.
  • In high-transparency environments with compressed decision cycles, strategy emerges more from the aggregation of decentralized tactical realities than from exclusive top-down imposition. This bottom-up strategy is not an anomaly of the Ukrainian case but a structural and distinctive feature of multi-domain warfare.
  • For Italy and for NATO, the implications of these strategic dynamics are concrete. Armed forces that, in a future high-intensity conflict, retained the command architectures, training pathways, and institutional cultures of previous conflicts would face a structural disadvantage that platform superiority alone would not be enough to overcome.
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