Recent dismissals and instability in the military leadership
The sudden dismissal of General Zhang Youxia, the highest-ranking officer in the People’s Liberation Army after Xi Jinping, has caused a real earthquake within the Chinese armed forces, the largest on the planet with over two million active soldiers. The announcement came on January 24, 2026, from the Ministry of National Defense: Zhang Youxia and General Liu Zhenli, another senior member of the Central Military Commission, were under investigation for serious disciplinary and legal violations. The immediate result was dramatic: the Central Military Commission—the body that directs and controls the entire military apparatus—was reduced from seven to only two active members: Xi Jinping himself and General Zhang Shengmin, responsible for internal discipline. Such a clear power vacuum inevitably generates operational uncertainty and raises deep doubts about the real cohesion and readiness of the armed forces, just as Beijing faces growing tensions on several international fronts.
To gauge the symbolic and political significance of what is happening, we need only look back to 2022: during the closing ceremony of the 20th Chinese Communist Party Congress in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, Xi Jinping had former General Secretary Hu Jintao, then 79, who was sitting right next to him, removed live on television. The gesture, captured on camera and witnessed by over 2,000 delegates, was commented on around the world as “the perfect purge on live TV.” Since then, purges have continued, gradually consolidating Xi’s absolute power over the party and the armed forces. Today, with Zhang Youxia—a long-time ally—in the crosshairs, Xi appears both more isolated and more unchallenged at the top of the military, in a context that recalls, albeit with different motivations, the great purges of the past.
The day after the announcement, the People’s Liberation Army Daily, the official organ of the armed forces, published a harsh editorial: Zhang and Liu had “betrayed the trust and expectations of the Party,” and “no one, regardless of rank or position, will be spared.” The insistence that the crackdown will be “ruthless even with friends” is a clear signal. However, many analysts believe that corruption is only the façade: behind it could lie more serious accusations, such as the formation of internal factions, attempts to resist Xi’s line, or even – according to rumors reported by the Wall Street Journal – the sharing of nuclear secrets with the United States. Whatever the truth may be, the message is clear: in Xi’s China, there are no longer any free zones.
These are not isolated purges. Since 2023, Xi has removed or investigated dozens of senior officers, including former vice-chairmen of the Central Military Commission such as He Weidong, Miao Hua, and Li Shangfu, many of whom have been expelled from the party and literally disappeared from the public scene. The result is a Commission reduced to a mere extension of Xi’s personal will, with an immediate impact on troop morale and the smooth running of daily operations. The large-scale air and naval exercises around Taiwan in December 2025 demonstrated that the military machine remains formidable, but instability at the top risks slowing down its effectiveness.
Historical context: personal ties and the long trail of purges
The roots of this turning point lie in a personal and family history intertwined with the events of the communist revolution. Zhang Youxia and Xi Jinping shared deep ties: their fathers had fought side by side in the civil war that brought Mao Zedong to power in 1949, founding the People’s Republic of China (excluding Taiwan). Both grew up as ‘red princes’ – the offspring of revolutionary cadres – and knew each other from childhood, becoming trusted allies. Zhang, who had direct combat experience in the border wars against Vietnam in the 1970s and 1980s, was chosen by Xi in 2022 as senior vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission, with an exemption from the retirement age: a gesture that testified to absolute trust.
This is precisely why his downfall seems so shocking. Purging a long-time ally, a veteran with revolutionary credentials, sends an unequivocal message: no one in Xi’s inner circle is untouchable. The anti-corruption campaign launched in 2012 has already affected more than 110 senior officers, but now it is affecting the power network built by Xi Jinping himself. Liu Zhenli, head of the Joint Staff Department, was another expert voice: his removal deprives the leadership of objective advice on the real capabilities and serious shortcomings of the People’s Liberation Army, particularly in terms of logistics, force projection, and advanced technology.
Since coming to power, Xi has pushed for radical reforms to transform the People’s Liberation Army into a modern, globally projected force: reorganization of theater commands, heavy investment in artificial intelligence, hypersonic missiles, aircraft carriers, and cyber capabilities. The purges of 2014-2018 eradicated the old corrupt networks inherited from the Jiang Zemin era; the current ones, however, are targeting sensitive sectors such as the Missile Force (responsible for the nuclear and ballistic arsenal) and the defense industry. This strengthens central control but creates a dangerous void of experience in an army that has not fought a real war in over forty years. The motivations therefore seem to be multiple: fighting corruption, but also eliminating any potential ideological or operational dissent, and extremely simplifying the chain of command to ensure absolute obedience.
Implications for regional stability and threats to Taiwan
The cycle of purges is taking place at a very delicate time for the Asia-Pacific region. For years, Beijing has intensified its provocative air and naval exercises around Taiwan, the democratic island it considers an inalienable part of its territory. These maneuvers, which are becoming increasingly close and complex, have greatly heightened tensions with the United States and Japan, which are ready to intervene in the event of an attack. An attempted invasion would put China on a direct collision course with the West, with unpredictable consequences.
Zhang Youxia was known for always advising caution regarding military action against Taiwan: he emphasized the PLA’s logistical shortcomings, the enormous human costs, and the difficulties of a large-scale amphibious war. His ouster could remove this element of internal moderation, favoring more risky decisions. At the same time, however, instability at the top complicates any operational plan: with the command structure in disarray, morale low, and inexperienced leadership, military action today would be risky. As analysts on the BBC have noted, these purges make a short-term attack less likely, because Beijing must first rebuild a reliable decision-making chain.
In Taipei, the armed forces are on high alert; and the Taiwanese government is watching developments with apprehension. China’s December 2025 exercises—involving hundreds of aircraft and ships—simulated naval blockades and landings, but internal instability could postpone plans for “reunification” by 2049, the centenary of the founding of the People’s Republic. The purges have also hit hard the Missile Force, the pillar of Chinese deterrence in a Taiwanese scenario. In a broader sense, Xi finds himself isolated: with Zhang Shengmin as his only remaining ally in the Commission, power is increasingly personalized and therefore vulnerable to misjudgments, with risks of accidental escalation even in the South China Sea.
Future prospects: between absolute control and internal risks
Looking ahead, the fate of the People’s Liberation Army will depend almost entirely on the choices of Xi Jinping, who today exercises unprecedented control.
Purges may accelerate the promotion of younger, technologically savvy, and fanatically loyal officers, but at the same time they risk generating widespread resentment, low morale, and decision-making paralysis at critical moments. In a military organization of this scale, reshuffles at the top always create periods of “uncertainty” that historically weaken cohesion and operational effectiveness.
Whatever the real motivations—endemic corruption, consolidation of personal power, or preventive elimination of dissent—the message that emerges is clear: in Xi’s China, loyalty must be absolute and unconditional, with no exceptions or protected areas. In the coming months, we will see who will be promoted to fill the gaps left by the purged generals; however, given the slow pace of communist bureaucracy, uncertainty will continue to reign for a while. For Taiwan and its allies, this could represent a valuable window of opportunity to strengthen defenses and deterrence; for Beijing, on the other hand, it is a tough test of the resilience of its military apparatus in an era of growing global tensions, as discussed in depth in Foreign Affairs.
Photo: By Kremlin.ru, CC BY 4.0
