Impact of Offensive Operations on the Iranian Naval Fleet
Offensive operations conducted by the United States and Israel have severely compromised Iran’s conventional naval fleet, resulting in the sinking of dozens of vessels and the destruction of several major combat ships. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Navy, however, maintains operational capabilities through asymmetric tactics, including drones, underwater mines, and fast vessels such as motorboats and patrol boats. These persistent threats, particularly targeting oil and gas tankers, have effectively disrupted commercial traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, the only route for entry into and exit from the Persian Gulf, through which approximately 20% of the world’s oil supplies transit.
The United States and Israel have largely neutralized Iran’s conventional naval fleet through a bombing campaign launched on February 28. Although the Iranian threat to the Strait of Hormuz—one of the world’s most critical maritime routes—has diminished, it has not been eliminated. Iran has effectively enforced the closure of the strait, employing asymmetric warfare tactics to hinder the transit of 20% of the world’s oil supplies. In addition to the conventional navy, the IRGC—designated as a terrorist organization by various countries, including Italy—has its own naval units that continue to interfere with merchant ships in the Persian Gulf.
“Although the Iranian Navy is largely ineffective in terms of conventional combat at this stage, the IRGC’s naval component retains the ability to harass merchant ships,” noted Sascha Bruchmann, a military and security affairs analyst at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, “this keeps alive the perception of a risk that most shipping companies and civilian insurers consider unacceptable”.
Details on Iranian naval losses
The United States rendered the Iranian conventional navy ineffective as of February 28. On March 11, the U.S. military stated that it had sunk 60 Iranian ships. Satellite imagery and publicly released military footage indicate that most of the Iranian naval fleet has been damaged or destroyed. Among the units no longer operational are the two Mowj-class warships, the Alvand-class frigate Sabalan, and the advanced support ship Makran, which provided Tehran with limited long-range power projection capabilities. A similar fate befell dozens of fast attack patrol boats, which formed the backbone of the IRGC’s asymmetric naval strategy in the Persian Gulf.
On March 4, a U.S. submarine torpedoed the Iranian warship IRIS Dena in the Indian Ocean, near Sri Lanka, as it was returning from multinational exercises. This marks the first confirmed sinking of a surface warship by a submarine in a wartime context since 1982, when Britain sank the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano during the Falklands War, underscoring the scope and determination of the U.S. campaign.
These losses have not eliminated the Iranian threat to navigation in the Persian Gulf. On March 11, Iranian projectiles struck the civilian oil tanker Mayuree Naree, flying the Thai flag, during an attempt to transit the strait. Images of the crew’s rescue showed damage just above the waterline near the stern, a signature typical of explosive-laden surface drones that strike at waterline level.
Evolution of Iranian Naval Doctrine
Iran revised its naval doctrine following the sinking of roughly half of its conventional fleet by the U.S. Navy in a single day in April 1988. That action was in retaliation for a previous attack on a U.S. warship. Even then, it became clear that a symmetric naval war against a superpower was an ineffective strategy. This was followed by a decade-long shift toward asymmetric tools, such as fast-attack patrol boats, land-based anti-ship missiles, naval mines, mini-submarines, and, more recently, unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) configured as floating devices.
Iran has institutionalized this division into two distinct naval components: one symmetric and one asymmetric. The Iranian Navy, part of the regular armed forces, has maintained a conventional fleet for prestige purposes and occasional long-range deployments. The primary offensive tool, however, is the IRGC’s naval units, designed for disruption and interdiction operations in the shallow, island-rich waters of the Persian Gulf, where geography shortens distances and partially neutralizes the advantages of a conventional U.S. force. Over the years, the IRGC’s naval component has released footage of underground depots containing fast-attack patrol boats, some reportedly configured as unmanned surface vehicles or suicide boats. These tactics are similar to those employed by Ukraine against the Russian Black Sea Fleet, although analysts consider the Iranian variants to be technically less sophisticated. “I doubt they can inflict the same kind of damage on U.S. warships that Ukraine has inflicted on Russian ships,” Bruchmann commented, adding that a more plausible target is the civilian shipping that supplies global oil markets.
U.S. Central Command stated on March 10 that it had sunk 16 Iranian mine-laying vessels. However, Mohammad Farsi, a former Iranian naval officer, noted that focusing on mines misses the essence of the threat. “Any vessel can do it, even the IRGC speedboats currently in the Persian Gulf,” he said, “in my opinion, as a naval officer, there is no need for Iran to lay mines at the mouth of the Persian Gulf right now. The reason ships aren’t passing through is that companies know the probability of being hit is extremely high”. He pointed to the capabilities of Iranian drones near the islands of Qeshm, Hengam, and Larak, located close to major shipping routes, as the most immediate threat.
Economic and Strategic Consequences
This explains the rise in hydrocarbon prices, including the speculative effects of market operators, as well as the U.S. decision to threaten to strike the island of Kharg, a key strategic point for Iran. Covering an area of 90 km², Kharg accounts for 90% of the country’s hydrocarbon export capacity. If destroyed—currently targeted only for demonstration purposes in non-essential logistical areas, such as the airport—Iran would see its export capacity wiped out, with repercussions also for China, which receives a large portion of its oil via this route.
The United States has indicated that, should the Strait of Hormuz reopen and stabilize, it will not strike the oil terminals in Kharg. This is a negotiating dynamic in which the only certainty is the current disruption of transit through the strait, with growing concerns on the part of China.
The Iranians have stated that, in the event of attacks on the Kharg pumping areas, they would respond by striking similar installations in the Arab Gulf states. However, the extent of Iran’s remaining capabilities remains uncertain. The Strait of Hormuz allows for the safe passage of only one ship in each direction in peacetime; the sinking of an oil or gas tanker at the narrowest point, due to mines or surface attacks, would cause a prolonged and difficult-to-resolve blockade.
Similarly, a U.S. occupation of the Iranian side of the strait (the opposite side belongs to Oman) with ground troops, such as the Marines, would not solve the problem, as the IRGC could continue to strike transiting vessels from the Iranian hinterland using drones—the most likely option—or medium- or short-range missiles. Iran, which is more than five times the size of Italy, has not been affected by U.S. and Israeli actions in its eastern, predominantly rural regions, and may retain offensive capabilities that have not yet been revealed.
Prospects for a Resolution of the Conflict
The question now is whether there are any rational solutions to the conflict. An agreement between the parties does not appear feasible at this time, given that the U.S. administration insists on Iran’s unconditional surrender. At the same time, an internal revolution seems unlikely, considering that the late Supreme Leader (Khamenei Sr.) had ordered the physical elimination of opponents.
The IRGC has eliminated thousands of young dissidents, including some who were assassinated in hospitals where they were being treated for injuries. This has dispersed the core of the protest movement, making a rapid regrouping unlikely. The situation is evolving, and with each passing day, a truce through diplomatic agreement appears increasingly to be the rational solution, albeit a complex one due to the absence of a credible mediator (excluding Russia, Turkey, and China).
