Western policy in the post-Soviet space from mid-2000s to the present day
In the mid-2000s, the prevailing understanding of how to describe the state of world affairs underwent significant changes. Scholars of international relations no longer regarded the world as unquestionably “unipolar”.
Instead, many experts tended to view the international system as still dominated by a coalition led by the United States and its Western allies, but facing challenges from the resurgent powers of China and Russia (R. Kagan, The Return of History and the End of Dreams), as well as a range of other phenomena such as ethnic loyalties, religious movements, underemployment, migration, and conflicts between protectionism and free trade (J. Derrida, In Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International).
As early as in 2002, the analysis of the possibilities for extending the unipolar moment was revisited, and it was concluded that the challenge to unipolarity could come from within the US and would depend on whether America was governed by those who wished to preserve and use unipolarity to achieve not only American but also global ends, or by those who wanted to give it up, retreating to “Fortress America”, or passing the burden to multilateral institutions as the heirs of American hegemony (C. Krauthammer, The Unipolar Moment Revisited).
Other scholars, in more recent studies, have argued that the liberal international order entered an irreversible crisis in the mid-2000s due to at least two key traumatic events that set it on a path to decline: the global war on terror, including the decision to engage in a war with Iraq, and the global financial crisis. Both of these events were the result of the actions of the West and undermined the foundations on which the liberal international order was built (A. Colombo, Il suicidio della pace: perché l’ordine internazionale liberale ha fallito).
As the likelihood that a unipolar world order based on liberal internationalist values could prevail diminished, the West became increasingly focused on geopolitical rivalry with the ascending powers China and Russia, including in the post-Soviet space.
This approach was reflected in the launch of the process of the “rebalancing” of US diplomatic and military efforts from West to East (R. Kagan, The Ambivalent Superpower) and the accompanying redistribution of responsibilities within the Western alliance. The US was to increasingly focus on a “pivot to Asia” to counter China, gradually reducing its engagement in the Middle East while empowering its key allies in the region, and a shift from a policy of liberal engagement to a policy of containing Russia. The European allies, having already addressed the first-order priorities in Eastern and Central Europe, were to concentrate on consolidating the institutional ties and civil society platforms established in the post-Soviet space in the 1990s and early 2000s, and lay out enlargement and neighborhood pathways to compete with Russia’s influence.
The trends in the oil and gas industry described in the previous article reflected changes in the international system. With the advent of shale oil and gas production, the US became self-sufficient in energy supplies and less interested in investment projects in the post-Soviet space. Europe, by contrast, decided to maintain and even expand its presence in the energy sector of this region.
Russia’s national interests and foreign policy priorities
A characteristic feature of this period was a gradual change in the hierarchy of Russia’s priorities: national interests, previously considered vital, faded into the background, giving way to interests previously considered secondary.
The post-Soviet model in Russia, which envisioned a duopoly of power between political forces oriented toward full integration into a “unipolar” liberal-internationalist agenda and elite groups that preferred to maintain influence in the countries of the former USSR and among former Soviet allies around the world through close interdependence with the post-Soviet elites there and the creation of a “multipolar” world order, was supplemented by a third policy line, oriented toward the creation of an authoritarian system of governance in Russia itself, possessing a distinct political culture and a corresponding set of state institutions, and pursuing a foreign policy that reflects the concept of realism in international relations.
This reconfiguration of the policy model took place gradually and was not predetermined. On the one hand, there was a growing awareness that becoming an equal sovereign partner in the institutional framework designed by the West to regulate international affairs and the global economy was hardly feasible. This realization, in turn, translated into the perception of growing risks of losing political control in Russia itself, the longer it remained in the orbit of a much larger and more diversified conglomerate of Western states and trans-national organizations. On the other end of the scale were considerations related to the “guns and butter” dilemma: trade flows with the West – with Europe in the raw materials sector and in various industrial sectors, and with the US in sectors such as IT and space technology – generated high incomes and assisted the development of advanced technologies.
As the ratio between the attractiveness of continued cooperation and the associated risks (real or perceived) decreased, the likelihood of a transition from the post-Soviet model to an updated one increased.
The revised framework envisaged Russia offering its international partners a broader range of policy options: to design relations in accordance with the post-Soviet format that already existed with states such as Belarus, or to use the more neutral BRICS format, which did not have to imply a strong emphasis on the Soviet legacy either in ideology or in interactions with specific elite groups in these countries.
In the case of the former Soviet republics, this led to a recalibration in the hierarchy of Russia’s priorities and to a different vision of possible scenarios for relations with these neighboring states. The changes were particularly relevant for the South Caucasus, as realist concepts often find application in unstable regional environments and conflict zones located at the intersection of the geopolitical interests of multiple actors, and were reflected in the following events:
- Russia further reduced its military presence in the South Caucasus. At the same time, Russia expanded its network of military bases in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and the North Caucasus, increasing the integration of these facilities into the regional network of Russian military installations. Taken together, these events indicated an increased emphasis on projecting military power into the South Caucasus from outside and a reduction in Russia’s dependence on the internal governance systems of these states for its defense needs in the region.
- Russia’s trade relations with Türkiye reached a new level in strategically important sectors such as natural gas and nuclear energy. The interests of the two countries repeatedly intersected in Libya, Syria, Ukraine and the Sahel, but differences have so far been resolved peacefully through the division of spheres of influence.
- China’s launch of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013 led to the expansion of its economic presence in the South Caucasus, eventually leading to the signing of “strategic agreements” with Georgia and Azerbaijan in 2023. China’s large-scale investments in the oil and gas sector in Central Asia transformed the political and security environment in the Caspian Sea region.
The application of realism in international affairs: Russia in the Syrian conflict
The analysis of Russia’s actions during and after the Syrian conflict serves to illustrate foreign policy behavior that is largely in keeping with the principles of realism.
Actions taken:
- Russia’s military operation in Syria started following the first military conflict in Ukraine in 2014, and was completed before the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in 2022. In 2024, Russia did not intervene to prevent the fall of the Assad regime during the ongoing war in Ukraine.
Objectives achieved:
- The Russian armed forces acquired real-life combat experience and the opportunity to test military equipment and weapons systems.
- Russia avoided being drawn into a protracted military conflict in Syria in conjunction with the war in Ukraine.
Actions taken:
- Russia provided logistical support to Iran’s operations in Syria, while maintaining constructive relations with Israel, Türkiye and the Gulf monarchies.
Objectives pursued:
- Maintain the division of power in the Middle East between the main regional players and their coalitions of international allies.
- Prevent the formation of a single military-political alliance that may achieve regional hegemony in the Middle East and undermine Russia’s interests.
Actions taken:
- In 2015, Russia launched a military operation in Syria to prevent the collapse of the Assad regime. A military presence in the inland provinces of the country was needed primarily to achieve this specific goal.
- Over the past year, Russia has engaged in dialogue with the al-Sharaa government focused on “restoring the territorial integrity of Syria” and achieving “stability of the region”.
Objectives pursued:
- The failure to achieve “absolute gains” has led Russia to focus on maximizing “relative gains” – retaining naval bases on the Syrian coast, given their importance for maintaining a presence in the Mediterranean and on the African continent.
- Having failed to preserve the regime inherited from the Soviet Union, Russia is seeking to simultaneously leverage legacy ties in Syria’s coastal regions and establish security, economic and trade cooperation with the new central government.
- The discourse focused on territorial integrity and regional stability promotes the idea of providing assistance in creating a functioning Syrian state, rather than a springboard for the spread of radical Islam near Russia’s borders.
Although Russia is not a liberal democracy, it has nonetheless used soft power and economic instruments in Syria, but it has done so by alternating between the post-Soviet legacy instruments and the multi-vector policy concept, and it has done so both in its relations with the Assad regime and with the new government that overthrew Assad.
The al-Sharaa government’s origins in radical Islamic movements did not create an insurmountable obstacle – realism views international relations through the prism of competition between states and does not regard ideological narratives and non-state organizations as independent political phenomena.
Conclusions
The signpost events that occurred in the South Caucasus in recent years included: the rise to power of a new political leadership in Armenia in 2018, Georgia’s deviation from a clear path of EU integration, Azerbaijan’s wars in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020 and 2023, the US-brokered TRIPP agreement and Armenia’s still unresolved relations with Azerbaijan and Türkiye, and the ups and downs in relations between Azerbaijan and Russia.
Many experts rightly attribute the lack of serious, concerted efforts by Russia to counter some of these events, particularly those concerning the outcome of Azerbaijan’s wars and Armenia’s drift toward the US and the EU, to Russia’s apprehension of being drawn into a military conflict in the Caucasus in conjunction with the war in Ukraine. While this argument is undoubtedly very important, it may not provide an exhaustive explanation. Russia’s military operation in Ukraine clearly imposes important limitations, however, it has not led to a halt in Russia’s activities in Syria, Libya and the Sahel region.
Russia’s reticence in shaping the regional agenda in the South Caucasus may also be linked to the fact that current events, viewed from a realist perspective, are perceived as posing a limited threat to its vital interests.
It is reasonable to assume that Russia evaluates events in the South Caucasus based on the degree to which they impact security along Russia’s borders and through the prism of the distribution of power in the South Caucasus and Central Asia region as a whole.
After the dissolution of the USSR, each of the three South Caucasus states pursued a different policy line: Armenia prioritized relations with Russia and Iran, Georgia with the West, and Azerbaijan opted for a multi-vector policy. The Central Asian states simultaneously engaged with the West, Russia and China. Possible changes in the orientation of any of these individual states, such as Armenia’s drift westward, do not necessarily create new risks for Russia’s interests as long as the balance is maintained at the regional level.
Regarding the latter aspect, China’s presence in the region and the uncertainty with regard to developments in Iran, could make it premature or unnecessary to take action.
Previously:
Energy, Transport and Infrastructure Alliances in the Caspian Region. Part 1
Azerbaijan and the Great Power Politics in the post-Cold War international system
The oil and gas sector in Azerbaijan and Central Asia in the post-Soviet period – part 3
Europe’s Southern Gas Corridor in the context of the “Great Gas Game” in Eurasia. Part 4