Introduction
The Mediterranean—long referred to as the “Enlarged Mediterranean”—is an area of strategic interest to our nation in terms of its security and geopolitical and economic interests. Currently, the Expanded Mediterranean incorporates the geographical Mediterranean Sea, the Black Sea (now a geographical area at the center of military competition with Moscow), the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean to the east, the Atlantic Ocean to the Gulf of Guinea to the west, and the Arctic region to the north. Furthermore, last year’s campaign by our Carrier Strike Group in the Indo-Pacific has, in fact, extended the Greater Mediterranean at least to Southeast Asia and perhaps even a little further… or at least makes that area an important appendage to the area of reference for our strategic interests in terms of security and economic policy.
Events in these areas have direct consequences on Italy’s interests and on the stability of the entire country. Therefore, in order to protect its interests, our nation must maintain freedom of movement and initiative in the area. However, this geopolitical and strategic analysis does not aim to analyze the Wider Mediterranean as such, but rather to focus on the geographical Mediterranean (Mare Nostrum), a strategic area in which most of our current and future national priorities are concentrated. In fact, numerous state and non-state players (terrorism, organized crime, illegal immigration, contractors, etc.) compete in this arena, and these realities can pose a series of threats to Italy.
Today’s landscape is very different from that of the Cold War period, which for many decades was able to suspend the chronic conflicts in the Mediterranean basin through a balance of forces that ‘held back’ possible conflicts and prevented the emergence of regional powers. The current rapid naval rearmament of various coastal nations, in fact, risks compromising the fragile stability in the area. Furthermore, the resolute policies of regional and overseas states aim to expand their hegemony and influence in the Mediterranean, and the widespread ‘territorialisation’ of the high seas for the use of resources risks creating disputes that could lead to armed conflict. Moreover, the recent discoveries of significant natural gas deposits in the eastern waters of the Mare Nostrum (particularly in the territorial waters of Egypt, Cyprus, Israel, and Gaza) are considerably increasing tensions between coastal nations. Our nation finds itself at the center of this complicated and intricate web of regional and non-regional interests… However, its primary national interests are linked to the sea and, in particular, to the Mediterranean Sea.
The strategic importance of the Mediterranean
The Mediterranean has been one of the main areas of projection since before the unification of Italy in 1861, with the maritime interests of the two main kingdoms—Naples and Turin—merging into the unified state. The Mediterranean line—together with the Atlantic and European lines—has represented and continues to represent one of the three circles of Italian foreign policy.
However, the Mediterranean theater is where our nation can and must play a more important role. Furthermore, in recent decades – starting with the ‘Arab Spring’ of 2011 – the Mare Nostrum has taken on even greater geopolitical and strategic significance for Italy, which has been further exacerbated in some respects following the Russian Federation’s invasion of Ukraine. In fact, since February 24, 2022 – the day of the Russian invasion – international relations have been experiencing a long period of profound instability, dominated by growing conflicts and the continuous risk of regional and global escalation.
The Russian-Ukrainian war and, subsequently, the conflict between Israel and Hamas and then with Hezbollah and Iran, have demonstrated the crisis of the deterrence paradigm that emerged and developed after the Second World War, the growth of recklessness in the use of force by state and non-state actors, the increase in the level of crisis that these actors are willing to risk in undertaking military actions and, consequently, the difficulty of diplomatic instruments in curbing the factors of instability and violent confrontation (see M. Di Liddo, Il futuro delle crisi globali, in Rivista Marittima). The Mediterranean Sea, which represents 1% of the world’s seas, is nevertheless crossed by 20% of global maritime traffic. The Strait of Sicily is the hub of the main maritime routes connecting the eastern and western ocean areas, making it a bottleneck of extremely high geopolitical and strategic value. In fact, the Strait of Sicily is the center of gravity for Italy’s maritime security. Preserving its strongholds is an essential part of the national strategic dimension for security and defense in the Mediterranean.
The Strait of Sicily is the junction between Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East, and whoever manages to monitor and dominate this sea space is also able to control the maritime routes between the Suez Canal and the Strait of Gibraltar. In addition, this area is home to submarine cables through which data flows connecting Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia pass.
These cables constitute a significant critical infrastructure for Italy and its NATO allies, as the flow of information is essential for military operations, intelligence operations, national security, and the protection of related infrastructure. Our nation, being a processing economy (it imports raw materials and semi-finished products to export finished products ‘made in Italy’), is highly dependent on transport and maritime traffic. Furthermore, Italy imports almost all of its fossil fuel requirements. This situation highlights the need to consider the security and stability of supplier countries, gas and oil pipeline transit areas, and communication routes (particularly maritime routes). In fact, oil and gas arrive almost entirely by ship from the Persian Gulf, the two African oceans, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Black Sea through the crucial passages of Suez, Hormuz, and Bab El Mandeb (a high-risk hub and epicenter of conflict).
Overall, the Mediterranean is an area characterized by instability, uncertainty, and complex dynamics, resulting from instability in Libya, tensions between Morocco and Algeria, political instability in Tunisia, and the economic crisis in Egypt. Added to this are the ongoing fragility of the Balkans, the crisis in Lebanon, the war in Gaza, the war in Syria and the recent fall of Damascus, energy and territorial competition in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Russian-Ukrainian war with its naval and maritime implications in the Black Sea, Turkey’s neo-Ottoman ambitions, and Russia’s presence in Mediterranean waters.
The contested Mediterranean: the case of Libya
The Mediterranean Sea has become the theater in which President Putin has increasingly assertively demonstrated his desire to restore the Russian Federation’s former stature as a major global player, emphasizing its ability to operate outside its natural geographical perimeter. Among the objectives of Russia’s presence in the Mare Nostrum is, of course, Moscow’s desire to recreate the image of an influential and powerful Russia on the international stage. However, this should not obscure more immediate and concrete objectives, including ensuring internal security and guaranteeing and securing the protection and consolidation of Moscow’s economic and commercial interests (see A.R. La Fortezza, ‘The Russian presence in the Mediterranean waters and along its land borders’, in Rivista Marittima).
In fact, Russia’s penetration into the Mediterranean is justified from an economic and commercial point of view in both the arms and energy markets. It is worth remembering that several North African countries, primarily Algeria and Egypt, import a considerable amount of arms from the Russian Federation. Furthermore, Russia has supported (e.g., Syria) and continues to support directly and indirectly—through the Wagner group, now called Africa Corps and linked to the Russian Armed Forces—several countries bordering the Mare Nostrum (including Libya).
In essence, Russia’s political and military activism in the Mediterranean and in the countries bordering it must be perceived and seen as a significant risk for Italy, given that our nation has numerous strategic interests in terms of security and energy supply in this maritime area and with the states bordering it, in particular the countries of North Africa (specifically Algeria, Libya, and Egypt).
In this regard, the Mediterranean—in the event of conflict—could be a contested area, and our nation could even be involved on the front line in this scenario, which should prompt it to immediately equip itself with the necessary systems to ensure effective missile and drone protection systems and an A2/AD architecture that includes naval, air, and land assets (see M. Scopigno, Il nuovo ruolo della NATO (The New Role of NATO), in Geopolitica e Strategia. L’Italia nel Mediterraneo Allargato (Geopolitics and Strategy. Italy in the Wider Mediterranean).
However, in this scenario, Italy has to deal with another player: Turkey. In fact, Turkey is the architect of political-military initiatives in areas that are strategic for our nation, particularly in the Mediterranean theater, including the Eastern Mediterranean, the Balkans, and Libya. In this regard, Turkey’s presence in Libya has several functions and implications for Ankara and beyond. Its presence in Libya is fundamental to defending Turkey’s geopolitical and energy interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. In fact, with the memorandum of understanding between Ankara and Tripoli on the delimitation of their respective Exclusive Economic Zones, the Tripoli government has shared and supported Turkey’s criteria for demarcation. “Without Libyan cooperation, Turkey would be isolated in the Eastern Mediterranean, at the mercy of the maritime claims of other coastal states.”
Furthermore, Turkey’s help in defending Tripoli from General Haftar has laid the foundations for a Libya-Turkey alliance that is extremely useful for Ankara. In fact, the alliance with Tripoli has been essential in breaking Ankara’s isolation from the Arab world, where until then it could only count on Qatar. Turkey’s presence in Libya increases the mutual importance and influence of the two countries. However, all this has brought Turkey physically closer to Italy. It should be noted, however, that our nation has fruitful relations and ties with Turkey, a NATO ally. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, Ankara projects its influence throughout the Mediterranean and seems unwilling to allow interference. Over the years, Rome and Ankara have often taken similar positions on Libya, yet their coordination on this strategic issue is very poor. In this regard, Libya has strong historical ties with Italy, of which it was a colony for the first half of the 20th century. Gaddafi himself was born Italian and maintained important relations with Italy, particularly of a commercial nature, until the outbreak of the ‘Arab Spring’ (see D. Panebianco, Compendio. Maritime Security and Defense, Maritime Magazine Supplement).
Beyond the strong strategic interests that still exist, the strength of relations between Italy and Libya up to that point is evidenced by a number of agreements of great strategic importance, such as the 2008 agreement to create a series of infrastructure projects worth $5 billion (including the construction of a coastal highway that was supposed to heal the wounds of the colonial period) and to control illegal immigration. [1 – continued]
