How can a weaker state gain leverage in negotiations with a powerful and domineering neighbor? The historical case of relations between the United States and Mexico in the early postwar period can be used as a source of inspiration for realistic policies to contain the claims of the neighbor.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- Weak states can preserve sovereignty and autonomy in asymmetrical relationships.
- The historical case of the US and Mexico (1917-1938) is a realistic model: Mexico contained US pressure through delaying tactics, tactical compromises (e.g., the Buchareli Agreements), internationalization, and strategic use of the law, without renouncing the principles of the 1917 Constitution.
- Despite the existential Russian threat (unlike US economic hegemony over Mexico), Ukraine can adopt similar mechanisms: exploit internal Russian friction, maintain residual economic leverage, use the law as a temporary friction, internationalize the conflict, and manage nationalism to support “imperfect” compromises without becoming rigid.
- Buffer zones can become a system for reducing escalation and temporarily stabilizing lines of contact. They should be evaluated for operational feasibility (credible monitoring, drones, technical commissions), minority protection, and political acceptability.
- From a realistic perspective, multilateral diplomacy, EU/OSCE/UN involvement, and soft power (national narrative, international legitimacy) multiply the cards in Ukraine’s hand.
- Pragmatic dialogue can aim to stall for time while waiting to increase the political/reputational costs for Moscow.
- Italy should promote pragmatic de-escalation as the EU’s diplomatic pivot, favoring realistic containment.
English Version
Introduction
In contemporary debate on international relations, the concept of power asymmetry—developed by scholars such as Peter H. Smith and Raffaele Nocera—is often treated in deterministic terms: the stronger actor imposes its choices, while the weaker actor is relegated to mere reaction. Although intuitive, this interpretation risks oversimplifying more complex historical and political dynamics, in which even structurally subordinate actors sometimes exercise significant forms of proactivity and self-determination (agency), influencing the behavior of great powers and preserving significant margins of sovereignty.
This report adopts a realistic and pragmatic approach, with the aim of analyzing the “factual truth” of state behavior in conditions of structural inequality: how states act, what tools they use to limit escalation, and what compromises are politically sustainable, without making normative judgments.
To this end, the work begins with a historical analysis of the relationship between the United States and Mexico in the period 1917-1938, a phase characterized by strong tensions, threats of military intervention, and profound differences over the balance of sovereignty. This case study allows us to identify a series of negotiating and strategic mechanisms through which a weaker state managed to contain the pressure of a dominant power without formally renouncing its fundamental interests.
These mechanisms are then used as a key to interpreting the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, considering Ukraine as an actor operating in a situation of marked structural asymmetry. Particular attention is paid to the possible role of ‘buffer zones’ as a tool for conflict management, assessing their feasibility, limitations, and strategic implications in the European context.
Finally, the approach adopted responds to a practical purpose. In line with political realism and attention to national interests, this study concludes with medium-term evolutionary scenarios and policy recommendations for the European Union, NATO, and national actors, with specific reference to Italian national interests. Understanding how weaker states have historically preserved margins of autonomy in asymmetric contexts allows us to face current challenges with greater clarity, avoiding both the illusion of ideal solutions and the fatalism that reduces international politics to a mere exercise of force.
The focus of this study is therefore not a purely diachronic reconstruction, but the identification of recurring mechanisms for managing asymmetry: the tactical suspension of sovereignty, the postponement of controversial decisions, the instrumentalization of law and institutions, the selective internationalization of crises, and the use of diplomacy as a tool of containment rather than definitive solution. These mechanisms, which emerged in the inter-American context, remain surprisingly relevant today.
The reference to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict does not imply a forced comparison. However, a rigorous realistic analysis requires us to recognize an ontological divergence in the nature of the threat. While US hegemony over Mexico aimed at regional stability and the protection of economic interests, without questioning the existence of the Mexican state, Russian aggression carries with it an existential component that threatens the very political and territorial identity of Ukraine. Far from invalidating the comparison, this difference reinforces its strategic urgency. If Mexico had to manage asymmetry to protect its economic sovereignty, Ukraine must use the same mechanisms (delay, political cost, internationalization) to ensure its state survival. The thesis of this report is that, even in the face of maximalist objectives of annihilation, the dominant actor still acts within a cost-benefit calculation. The agency of the weak state consists in making the cost of annihilation so high that it forces the aggressor to fall back on sub-optimal objectives of mere control or influence.
The aim is rather to highlight how, even in profoundly different contexts, similar logics emerge in the management of power relations between unequal actors. Ukraine, like post-revolutionary Mexico, operates in a condition of obvious structural inferiority, but occupies a strategic position that makes it costly for the dominant actor to resort to purely coercive solutions. In both cases, the political survival of the weaker state depends on its ability to manage asymmetry by exploiting systemic constraints, internal divisions within the adversary, and opportunities in the international context.
The focus on buffer zones fits precisely into this framework. They are not analyzed as instruments of ideal pacification or “institutional engineering,” but as devices functional to reducing the risk of escalation and temporarily stabilizing high-intensity conflicts. In this sense, they represent a possible contemporary variation of those legal-political “gray zones” which, in the Mexican-US case, made it possible to contain the conflict without resolving it.
Asymmetry, realism, and agency of the weak state
In the ever-changing landscape of international relations, both the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and the historical US-Mexican conflict can be analyzed through a realist lens anchored in diplomatic practice. Realism, one of the dominant perspectives in the discipline, posits that state actors act primarily in accordance with their national interests and to ensure the security of their state. Its principles, derived from authors such as Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz, focus on concepts such as power balance, deterrence, national interest, realpolitik, and threat equilibrium. In this view, conflict resolution is a process that primarily involves the management of power. However, even in the context of competition for specific interests, diplomacy and negotiation remain necessary tools. Prudence is crucial, avoiding unilateral solutions in favor of the involvement of all parties. As Kenneth Waltz (1959: 188) noted, quoting Rousseau, war occurs because “there is nothing to prevent it.”
In the context of the conflict in Ukraine, a realistic approach invites us to consider the role of the European Union (EU). The EU can contribute diplomatic, political, and economic support.
The High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (EU HR) could facilitate international dialogue, promote respect for human rights, and support peacebuilding measures. To ensure compliance with any agreements, provide humanitarian assistance, and support reconstruction, the EU HR could establish an independent monitoring mechanism, reinforced by the involvement of other actors such as the UN. In this context, even post-Soviet regional bodies such as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), although greatly reduced in their political capacity and now largely dominated by Moscow, can at best play a technical or symbolic role, more useful as a channel of indirect communication than as a real negotiating platform.
Finally, power asymmetry is not a static condition, nor does it automatically produce predetermined outcomes. As historical studies show, it can be managed, mitigated, or exploited by the weaker actor through indirect strategies: negotiation, delaying tactics, internationalization of the conflict, and selective use of the law and institutions. The agency of the weak state therefore does not lie in its ability to reverse the balance of power, but in influencing its evolution, in some cases increasing the costs of escalation for the dominant actor and making some options less convenient. It is on this theoretical and practical ground that the analysis of the historical case of the US and Mexico is based.
The US-Mexico relationship: origin and nature of asymmetry
At the beginning of the 20th century, the relationship between the United States and Mexico was characterized by profound structural asymmetry. The United States emerged as a continental and hemispheric power, with significantly superior economic, military, and diplomatic capabilities. Mexico, on the other hand, was a country marked by political instability, internal conflicts, and economic dependence.
This asymmetry was rooted in the Monroe Doctrine and its subsequent reinterpretations, particularly the Roosevelt Corollary, which legitimized US intervention in the internal affairs of Latin American countries in the name of regional stability and the protection of American interests. Dollar Diplomacy further reinforced this approach, transforming economic power into an instrument of political and economic pressure.
However, the Mexican Revolution and the 1917 Constitution, with its highly social and avant-garde content, significantly changed the picture. By asserting sovereignty over natural resources and land, Mexico introduced an element of rupture that increased the political and diplomatic cost of direct US intervention.
The Mexican Constitution of 1917, particularly Article 27, represented a veritable “legal earthquake” in relations with the United States. The reaffirmation of state sovereignty over natural resources, including oil fields, directly affected the economic interests of numerous US companies.
From a realistic point of view, this act was not a purely ideological gesture, but a strategic move. Mexico used constitutional law and sovereignty as bargaining chips, aware that their strict application could lead to an escalation, but equally aware that their mere existence changed the terrain of confrontation.
Sovereignty, in this context, was not exercised in an absolute manner, but negotiated over time. This approach allowed Mexico to preserve the fundamental principles of the Constitution while accepting temporary compromises to avoid military intervention.
The Bucareli Agreements of 1923 represent a key passage in the period under analysis.
Through them, Mexico agreed to suspend the retroactive application of certain constitutional provisions relating to foreign property in exchange for diplomatic recognition by the United States.
From a realist perspective, the Bucareli Agreements can be interpreted not so much as a definitive renunciation of sovereignty, but rather as its tactical and temporary management. Although part of Mexican historiography has interpreted them as a concession imposed by US pressure, they allowed the Mexican government to gain time, stability, and international recognition, while preserving the fundamental principles of the 1917 Constitution in the long term.
In the 1930s, the evolution of the international context and the increase in the potential costs of direct intervention led the United States to adopt the “Good Neighbor Policy.” The formal abandonment of military interventionism in Latin America was not the result of an ideological conversion, but of a pragmatic reassessment of US national interests. For Mexico, this change represented a further expansion of its room for maneuver. The definitive expropriation of oil from US companies in 1938, although strongly contested, demonstrated the extent to which a weak state could go when the systemic context made intervention by the stronger party less convenient.
Russia-Ukraine relations: origin and nature of asymmetry
The Russian-Ukrainian conflict has its roots in complex historical, cultural, and economic connections. Ukraine has experienced periods of independence and external influence, particularly during Russian and Soviet rule, which have generated deep tensions relating to national identity, language, and geopolitical orientation.
The current phase of the conflict, which began in 2014 with Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its support for separatists in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, has seen prolonged armed clashes, a serious humanitarian crisis, and repeated attempts at a political solution (such as the Minsk Agreements under the auspices of the OSCE). The intensification of the conflict in 2022 has further deepened the crisis.
Ukraine’s geopolitical role is vital in relations between Russia and the West. While the EU and the US have condemned the annexation and imposed sanctions, Ukraine has pursued a clear rapprochement with the West. The issue of Crimea remains unresolved at the international level, and diplomatic efforts continue to face extremely complex humanitarian and socio-economic challenges.
Operational mechanisms of agency: concrete lessons from the US-Mexico case applicable to Ukraine
In light of the historical lessons offered by the asymmetrical relationship between the United States and Mexico in the interwar period, a number of operational options emerge that Ukraine could consider in a realistic perspective of managing asymmetry with the Russian Federation.
First, between the 1920s and 1930s, Mexico systematically exploited internal friction within the US political system: Congress and the Presidency, the State Department and oil lobbies, isolationists and interventionists, the ‘New Deal coalition’ and big industrial interests.
Mexican diplomacy deliberately moved not against ‘the United States’ as a unified bloc, but within its pluralistic decision-making system, strengthening the actors most inclined to compromise and isolating the more aggressive ones. Ukraine could adopt a more explicit strategy of differentiating the Russian system, avoiding a monolithic narrative of Russia as a unified actor and working on: economic elites affected by sanctions, regional administrations penalized by the conflict, technical and industrial apparatuses dependent on global chains. Not to ‘democratize’ Russia, but to increase the internal cost of continuing the conflict, as Mexico did by making intervention increasingly divisive for Washington.
Secondly, again in the 1930s, Mexico did not completely sever economic ties with the United States, even during the oil expropriation. On the contrary, it kept trade channels open, offered deferred compensation, and preserved areas of economic interdependence. This reduced the American incentive for a coercive response. Ukraine could: identify residual areas of economic interdependence with Russia (energy, transit, infrastructure, water, technical networks), keep them under Ukrainian control without completely disrupting them, and use them as gradual negotiating levers, not as tools of rupture. The implicit message is: cooperation is possible, but reversible. This is exactly the Mexican logic.
Mexico also used international law not to win cases, but to slow down decisions, make the use of force more expensive, and legitimize political compromises. The Bucharest Agreements were an example of legal containment of the conflict, not a solution. Ukraine could multiply parallel legal venues (arbitrations, courts, commissions), consciously accept that many decisions remain inconclusive, and use the law as a tool of strategic friction, not as a means of resolution. The value is not the final ruling, but the time, visibility, and cumulative pressure that the process generates.
Mexico obtained US diplomatic recognition before fully exercising economic sovereignty. The sequence was deliberate: first legitimacy, then assertiveness. In this sense, Ukraine could accept de facto provisional arrangements on the ground without granting definitive legal recognition, focusing instead on consolidating its international and state legitimacy. Material control can be partial and temporary; political recognition is the real strategic stake.
Mexican nationalism served above all to strengthen internal cohesion, legitimize external compromises, and reduce the political space for adventurous solutions. It was not used to directly provoke the United States. Ukraine could thus use national discourse to consolidate internal consensus on “imperfect” solutions, present compromises as strategic steps, and prevent nationalism from becoming a constraint that prevents any negotiation. Nationalism, as in the Mexican case, can serve to support resilience, not to harden positions.
Between 1917 and 1938, there was never a definitive solution to the fundamental disputes. Yet the conflict was managed, diluted, neutralized.