Terrorism and Shifting Extremism: The Radical Fringe in Europe

Key Takeaways

In Italy and Greece, anarchist and far-left extremism is showing renewed vitality, with arson attacks and sabotage against infrastructure and institutional symbols, often amplified by digital propaganda.
Europol integrates intelligence and analysis, while in Italy the Strategic Anti-Terrorism Analysis Committee (CASA) monitors the threat.
Events such as the crisis in the Middle East and the No TAV protests foster cohesion among anarchists, the far left, and other radical networks, with online platforms amplifying propaganda and radicalization.

Over the past five years, terrorism in Europe has undergone a complex evolution, marked by instability and growing ideological diversification. European cooperation, through Europol and its European Counter Terrorism Center (ECTC), plays a central role in coordinating counterterrorism activities, integrating analysis, intelligence, and operational cooperation.

The data provided by Europol’s Terrorism Situation and Trend Report reveals a dynamic picture in 2024, with 58 attacks and 449 arrests, most of which are linked to jihadism, which remains the main threat in terms of lethality. The digital dimension remains crucial: online platforms fuel radicalization and propaganda, while the use of artificial intelligence and deepfakes increases the risk of influence.

In recent years, anarchist and far-left extremism has shown renewed vitality in Europe, marking a reversal of the decline seen in the early years of the decade. The increase in violent incidents, particularly in Italy and Greece, highlights the persistence of radical groups capable of adapting their strategies to contemporary political and social contexts.

European anarchism, while drawing on a historical ideological tradition, manifests itself today through more fluid and decentralized forms of action, often linked to demands against capitalism, the state, and the prison system, with a communicative dimension amplified by digital platforms.

The terrorist actions recorded are a sign of increasing social tension.

Variable geometry threats: silent escalation of the anarchist threat in Italy.

Monitoring of the terrorist threat is based on different tools at national and European level, but cooperation is increasingly playing a crucial role. In Italy, the Annual Intelligence Report and the work of the Strategic Anti-Terrorism Analysis Committee (CASA) are the main channels for strategic assessment, supplemented by the District Anti-Mafia and Anti-Terrorism Prosecutors (DDA) and the police forces.

The Italian authorities carefully distinguish between acts of vandalism or damage and those that can be considered actual acts of terrorism or subversion. This distinction is based primarily on the intent and motivations of those who carry out the action.

Europol adopts different criteria: the category “left-wing & anarchist” includes all incidents attributable to that ideological area, even if they are not always formally classified as terrorism in individual national legal systems.

This explains the discrepancy: TE-SAT records numerous attacks in Italy and Greece, while in the Italian judicial system only some of these proceedings lead to formal charges of terrorism.

The Italian picture in recent years confirms the centrality of the anarchist-insurrectionist phenomenon.

The 2023 Annual Report of the Intelligence Agency defined the anarchist area as “the most concrete and insidious threat vector” in the domestic scenario. The incidents ranged from demonstrations and sit-ins to acts of vandalism, arson, and actions with rudimentary explosive devices, often claimed online through area websites. At the judicial level, however, only a few incidents have been formally treated as terrorism.

The most significant case was in Pisa in February 2023, when an incendiary device was placed at the city court. The incident, claimed online, led to the arrest of two militants in September 2025 for “acts of terrorism with deadly or explosive devices.” A second incident, the incendiary device in Narni in April 2025 at the University of Perugia, is still being assessed from a terrorism perspective.

However, various actions attributable to anarchist groups appear in the news and reports released by police headquarters, both in terms of the type of attack and the targets chosen. In 2023, a Molotov cocktail was thrown at a police station in Rome, and in the same year, there were a series of arson attacks on the high-speed rail line between Florence and Bologna. in 2024, the company Terna, linked to the defense sector, was targeted, and in 2025, an arson attack was directed against a Carabinieri barracks in Florence. Anarchist involvement is also suspected in the burning of police cars at the police station in Albano Laziale.

The Greek experience and the European context

Alongside Italy, Greece remains the other European epicenter of anarchist-insurrectionist activity. The attacks are mainly arson and sabotage and can be traced back to local anarchist cells. One of the incidents that had international resonance occurred in 2022 with the arson attack on the car of Susanna Schlein, first counsellor of the Italian embassy in Greece. Here, as in Italy, the modus operandi favours attacks on infrastructure, institutional headquarters, economic and symbolic targets, maintaining a low level of sophistication but a strong propaganda capacity.

On a broader level, there are also reports of episodes of eco-extremism and convergence with Marxist-Leninist areas in Europe, especially in relation to international events such as the war in Ukraine and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The composite front of contemporary radicalism: dynamics, convergences, and challenges

The Italian case shows the role of global events in propaganda: the crisis in the Middle East, the G7, and the No TAV construction sites have been constantly included in campaigns and used as means of collective cohesion.

Alongside these established trajectories, in recent years there have been thematic convergences which, while not translating into operational alliances, have fostered moments of tactical coexistence in the public sphere.

The Italian Report 2025 highlighted how pro-Palestinian mobilizations have served as a unifying force for many dissenting voices, also representing a meeting point between anarchist components, extreme left-wing groups, and, in some cases, Islamist networks.

Despite coming from different ideological backgrounds, and in some cases very distant ones on fundamental issues such as personal freedom, feminism, and “LGBT rights,” these actors shared anti-Zionist and anti-militarist rhetoric, denunciation of “Western imperialism,” and support for the Palestinian cause, giving rise to marches and demonstrations in which these groups found themselves side by side, leading to violent clashes with the police and law enforcement personnel.

The Italian reports 2023 and 2025 confirm this dynamic, noting how radical opposition movements manage to combine anti-militarism, anti-repression, anti-fascism, and militant environmentalism, giving rise to a diverse front.

The challenge for the authorities is not only to intercept attacks, but also to counter the movement’s ability to renew itself, infiltrate social mobilizations, and exploit global conflicts as a propaganda tool. Prevention strategies should focus in particular on young people and digital environments, where radicalization finds the most fertile ground today.

It is also essential to promote, including in universities, the dissemination and in-depth study of narrative construction techniques, in order to recognize and counter ideological manipulation more effectively.

At the same time, it is a priority to strengthen the perception of authority and legitimacy of law enforcement agencies through institutional communication initiatives and integrated training courses aimed at consolidating the relationship of trust with civil society and increasing the strategic response capacity of the democratic system.

Note: The opinion expressed in the articles are those of the respective authors and may not reflect the views of the Machiavelli Foundation.

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