Special forces and urban warfare: lessons from the past and challenges for Italy

Introduction

Global urbanization is profoundly transforming the nature of conflicts. According to the United Nations, over 55% of the world’s population already lives in urban areas, and this figure could exceed 70% by 2050 (UN World Urbanization Prospects). Cities are thus becoming decisive hubs of political and economic power and, at the same time, arenas of military and hybrid competition, where adversaries take advantage of building density, the presence of civilians, critical infrastructure, and stringent legal constraints.

At a strategic level, the unstable situation confirms the centrality of urban areas: the 2025 Annual Report indicates that 2024 will see the highest number of conflicts since the end of World War II (Intelligence Intelligence Report 2025). In this context, state and non-state actors seek refuge, resources, and political legitimacy in cities, transforming them into contested theaters. This creates a need for tools capable of producing selective effects quickly, while limiting collateral damage and reputational risks.

Special Forces decisive in cities

Special Forces are designed to influence decisions and outcomes in highly complex contexts. In an urban environment, this translates into four main lines of effect:

1) Understanding. Special Forces generate a superior information picture by merging HUMINT, SIGINT, and ground/air sensors. Deep micro-teams perform discreet reconnaissance, validate targets, and update the posture of friendly forces in real time. The goal is to reduce the information friction typical of cities, where lines of sight, electromagnetic noise, and the presence of civilians degrade conventional sensors (NATO Special Operations Headquarters).

2) Shaping. Before the main assault, Special Forces prepare the ground by isolating the enemy, disrupting chains of command and logistics, and securing the most dangerous pockets. In this phase, a central role is played by Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB), a systematic process of collecting and analyzing data on terrain, infrastructure, population, and the enemy, also used by Western doctrines (U.S. Army – FM 34-130 IPB).

3) Strike. During the maneuver phase, Special Forces enable precision effects: designation of high-value targets, precision fire support, surgical actions on command hubs, depots, and communication nodes. Integration with joint fire is ensured by advanced controllers and streamlined C2 chains, an essential requirement in contexts saturated with IEDs and irregular combatants (Ministry of Defense – IED).

4) Integrate. The value of Special Forces in cities depends on their ability to interoperate with ground brigades, air assets, and police units. They transform information into decisions and decisions into effects, acting as a force multiplier: a few well-positioned teams compress the time required for operations, reducing collateral damage and improving the protection of civilians.

In summary, the urban effectiveness of Special Forces stems from three key attributes: discretion, precision, and integration. It is this symbiosis—accurate intelligence, rapid timing, selective effects—that explains why their contribution has been decisive, though often invisible, in the major urban campaigns of recent decades.

Operational lessons from Grozny, Fallujah, and Mosul

Grozny (1994–1995; 1999–2000)

Chechnya was the first major laboratory for post-Cold War urban warfare. In the first campaign in Grozny (December 1994–March 1995), Russian forces attempted a frontal assault with armored divisions and mechanized infantry. This approach, typical of Soviet doctrine, proved disastrous: columns of tanks were trapped in city streets, targeted by small groups of rebels armed with portable rocket launchers, while snipers and machine gunners occupied rooftops and exploited underground passages (RAND – Russia’s Urban Warfare Lessons).

The lack of accurate reconnaissance and minimal use of Special Forces left conventional units blind. Within a few weeks, Moscow suffered thousands of casualties and a collapse in morale. The city became a symbol of the vulnerability of a modern army when facing a motivated enemy in an urban environment.

The second Grozny campaign (1999–2000) saw a paradigm shift. Spetsnaz units were deployed early on with infiltration and target designation tasks. They operated at night to locate snipers, neutralize command centers, and guide artillery. The city was surrounded, cut off from supplies, and subjected to preliminary bombardment. At the cost of devastation and heavy civilian casualties, Russia succeeded in capturing the Chechen capital.

Lesson: Grozny demonstrates that without Special Forces, urban warfare becomes a death trap; with them integrated, the burden on conventional forces is reduced and operational time is compressed, even in extremely hostile environments.

Fallujah (2004)

The Iraqi city of Fallujah became a stronghold for insurgents after the 2003 invasion. American forces realized that a direct assault would result in enormous losses. Prior to Operation Phantom Fury (November 2004), US Special Forces – in particular Navy SEAL Team 3 and Delta Force – conducted night infiltrations, gathered HUMINT from local sources, intercepted enemy communications, and mapped the insurgent defensive network (U.S. Army – Phantom Fury Report).

During the main assault, the Marines advanced house by house, but success depended on the constant support of Special Forces:

• forward air controllers (JTAC) designated targets for air and precision artillery fire;
• surgical raids aimed to neutralize chains of command and arsenals;
• operational integration between Special Forces and conventional infantry ensured continuity of maneuver.

The house clearing model that emerged in Fallujah—coordinated room-by-room operations with restrictive but effective rules of engagement—became a model for NATO (NATO Lessons Learned Center).

Lesson: Fallujah demonstrates how Special Forces are essential in pre-shaping the battlefield and integrating with conventional forces.

Mosul (2016–2017)

The battle of Mosul was the largest urban operation since World War II. ISIS had fortified the city with underground tunnels, car bombs, IEDs scattered everywhere, and the innovative use of armed commercial drones (CSIS – ISIS Drones).

The Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS), trained and supported by Western Special Forces, spearheaded the assault. Operating alongside them were British SAS, American Delta Force, and French special units. The contribution of the Special Forces was threefold:

• real-time reconnaissance and target designation, using drones and ISR assets;
• JTAC embedded function, with FS operators guiding precision air strikes;
• multi-level intelligence fusion, combining satellite imagery, SIGINT, and local HUMINT (Operation Inherent Resolve).

The work of the Special Forces was crucial in reducing the losses of conventional forces and maintaining the cohesion of the front. Without this contribution, the assault would have degenerated into uncontrollable bloodshed.

Lesson: Mosul demonstrates that Special Forces are not just tactical tools, but true “information hubs” capable of orchestrating urban complexity.

Comparative summary

Analyzing Grozny, Fallujah, and Mosul, three constants emerge:

1. Pre-shaping: Special Forces are decisive in the preliminary phase, isolating the enemy and creating favorable conditions.
2. Integration: Special Forces and conventional forces must act in symbiosis, otherwise the city becomes unsustainable.
3. Information hub: in complex scenarios, Special Forces translate intelligence into rapid action, reducing time and losses.

Implications for Italy

The growing centrality of the urban domain is not an abstract issue, but an operational reality that directly affects Italy. The 2025 Annual Report notes that in 2024 there were 56 active armed conflicts, the highest number since World War II (Relazione Intelligence 2025). Most of these took place in cities, from Gaza to Aleppo, from Mariupol to Khartoum.

The risk picture for Italy

• Abroad, Italy participates in missions in high-density urban contexts: UNIFIL in Lebanon, the anti-ISIS coalition in Iraq, and stabilization operations in the Sahel. In all these theaters, the ability of Special Forces to move discreetly, gather intelligence, and strike with precision is a security multiplier for our contingents.
• At home, the threat of so-called urban jihad is not remote. Propaganda from Daesh and other extremist groups often mentions Italy as a target, exploiting the inherent vulnerability of metropolitan areas. A small cell, hidden in a densely populated neighborhood, can inflict enormous damage without conventional forces being able to detect it in time.

Investment priorities

In light of these challenges, Rome should focus its efforts on three priorities:

1. Dedicated urban training. Units such as the 9th Col Moschin, the GOI, the GIS, and the 17th Wing already have levels of excellence, but training ranges and infrastructure are needed to simulate complex urban scenarios: tunnels, skyscrapers, residential areas. Training must also include interaction with police forces and conventional units, replicating the ‘friction’ typical of real-life scenarios.
2. NATO and EU interoperability. The experiences of Fallujah and Mosul have shown that Special Forces rarely act alone: they are integrated into multinational coalitions. For Italy, this means investing in common standards, streamlined chains of command, and secure real-time information exchange capabilities. The role of the Joint Special Forces Operations Command (COFS) is crucial: it guarantees doctrinal and operational consistency between the special units of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Carabinieri, while ensuring full interoperability with NATO allies (Ministry of Defense – COFS).
3. Emerging technologies. Tactical drones, artificial intelligence-based data analysis software, and cyber-intelligence tools are now an integral part of the Special Forces’ kit. Italy must strengthen synergies with the national defense industry and the private technology sector, creating an ecosystem that guarantees the FS autonomy and speed in acquiring innovative capabilities.

National interest

Ultimately, the question to ask is simple: how can we guarantee the security of the nation in an urbanized and unstable world? Special Forces are a strategic tool not only for protecting contingents abroad, but also for defending the national territory from hybrid threats. Preparing today for urban combat means strengthening Italy’s resilience tomorrow.

Conclusions

The urban battles of Grozny, Fallujah, and Mosul clearly demonstrate that combat in cities cannot be addressed with conventional means alone. Without Special Forces, urban warfare becomes a quagmire of losses and inefficiencies; with integrated Special Forces, it becomes manageable, albeit still complex and costly.

This lesson is particularly relevant for Italy. The national Special Forces, already recognized at NATO level for their skills and operational capabilities, must be further enhanced as a strategic tool, both in external projection and internal defense. Investing in specific training, interoperability, and emerging technologies is not an option but a national security imperative.

Urban conflict is the present, not a future prospect. Preparing today to conduct it means protecting the stability of the country and ensuring Italy a credible role in the most critical international contexts.

[Photo: American soldiers from the 1^st US Cavalry Division prepare to enter and clear a building during fighting in Fallujah, Iraq. Photo by Sergeant Johan Charles Van Boers, November 12, 2004 – public domain]