The paradigm shift in the terrorist threat
The terrorist threat has undergone a structural transformation over the last twenty years: from the centrality of organizations with well-established hierarchies to a model characterized by individuals acting independently, not directly linked or connected to a group or structured organization.
Strategic literature and the most recent studies on terrorism highlight how contemporary violence no longer necessarily requires membership of a structured group: a radicalizing idea, an ideological context of reference, and an operational opportunity are sufficient for the individual to become the decision-maker behind violent action. In this scenario, organizational membership gives way to a form of fluid ideological adherence, which may maintain a religious or political reference without translating into a direct operational link.
The concept of lone actor terrorism has its roots in the doctrine of leaderless resistance, developed in the 1980s by Louis Beam and initially associated with far-right circles. This model, which focuses on autonomous individual action to reduce the vulnerability of clandestine networks, was subsequently taken up and adapted in other ideological contexts, finding particular expression in the evolution of contemporary jihadism and the spread of isolated attacks, especially in Europe.
Increased investigative pressure on structured networks, combined with developments in counterterrorism and prevention, may be one of the main factors that have led terrorist strategy to favor low-complexity attacks that are easy to carry out, difficult to intercept, and have a high potential emotional and media impact.
Numerous European reports, in particular Europol’s Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) and the analyses produced by the EU Knowledge Hub on Prevention of Radicalisation, identify individual terrorism as one of the main internal threats to European security. The scale of the phenomenon is confirmed by several incidents that have marked public opinion: emblematic is the case of Nice in 2016, where an attack carried out with a rudimentary means, subsequently claimed by ISIS and consistent with its operational propaganda, resulted in a high number of victims and a strong sense of collective insecurity.
During 2025, several incidents recorded in Europe confirm the persistence and adaptability of the lone actor model in the terrorist threat landscape.
In this context, prevention is particularly complex. Pre-attack signals are often fragmented and disjointed, distributed across different levels: psychological, digital, and behavioral, making them difficult to detect in a timely manner. As highlighted by studies by the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), the so-called ‘lone wolf’ is never completely isolated: they operate within an ideological and communicative ecosystem that feeds their beliefs and helps justify violent action.
The target of hatred: how to construct an enemy
The construction of the enemy can be traced in all forms of extremism and radicalization. It involves identifying the target in an ethnic, religious, political, or social group and implementing a process of dehumanization, transforming it into an adversary and defining it by characteristics chosen as symbolic of intrinsic evil.
This process can lead to a progressive glorification of the use of force, to the point where, in the view of the radicalized subject, even the most extreme forms of violence, including mass atrocities, become morally acceptable.
Such dynamics can be found both in history and in the present day, as demonstrated by the case of anti-Semitism, a phenomenon that cuts across different eras and ideological contexts.
Anti-Semitism has spanned the entire political spectrum, adapting to different narratives and constantly renewing its communication and propaganda tools.
As Fiamma Nirenstein recalls in the report Antisemitism in Contemporary Europe, Bertrand Russell denounced as early as 1968, in an open letter to Polish Prime Minister Władysław Gomułka, a new wave of antisemitism based on distorted reasoning: Jews were identified as Zionists, Zionists as fascists, fascists as Nazis, until the absurd equation of victims with their executioners was reached.
The concept of ‘enemy’ has always been at the center of political reflection and conflict. Carl Schmitt identifies its foundation in the distinction between friend and enemy, where the latter is not only different or opposed, but is perceived as an existential threat to the political order. This construction becomes functional to the delegitimization of the adversary, transforming them into a subject against whom violence appears justified.
From an analytical perspective, the progressive stripping of the enemy of their human and political dimension is a necessary condition for violence against them to be normalized and made acceptable, as highlighted in the contributions of Zygmunt Bauman (Modernity and the Holocaust; Moral Blindness) and Hannah Arendt (The Origins of Totalitarianism).
In political struggle, these mechanisms have been widely used by insurrectionary movements that resorted to terrorism as a revolutionary tool in the 1970s. Organizations such as the Red Brigades in Italy, the RAF in Germany, ETA in Spain, and the IRA in Ireland constructed an image of the enemy consistent with their ideological narrative, identifying it in state institutions and their security apparatus, represented as instruments of oppression.
In lone actor terrorism, dehumanization plays a central role in the process of individual radicalization. The lone actor, while operating without direct command or organized affiliation, internalizes extremist narratives disseminated through digital environments, in which the enemy is constructed as an inferior, hostile, or unfaithful entity, deprived of its humanity. This ideological framing simplifies the perception of the world according to the logic of “us against them” and legitimizes the use of violence, transforming the victim into an abstract symbol to be targeted.
The importance of prevention and counteraction
Individual terrorism requires a multi-structured approach to prevention and counteraction, capable of integrating psychological, social, digital, and operational tools.
- Early prevention and early warning
Early prevention is one of the most complex challenges and is based on building effective networks that include:
- reporting systems based on behavioral and digital indicators;
- structured cooperation between schools, mental health services, social services, and law enforcement;
- specific training for teachers and educators to recognize weak signals without generating stigma.
Models such as the Multi-Agency Safeguarding Hubs (MASH) adopted in the United Kingdom are a European best practice, allowing for joint analysis of at-risk cases and reducing false positives.
- Countering in the digital dimension
The digital space is now the main vector of radicalization for actors operating independently. The following are therefore necessary:
- mechanisms for structured cooperation between law enforcement agencies and digital platforms;
- units specialized in monitoring emerging and decentralized environments;
- tools for the coordinated removal of content, capable of adapting to rapid migration to encrypted or self-hosted spaces.
The EU Internet Referral Unit (EU IRU) of Europol is a best practice in the coordinated identification and removal of terrorist content.
- Public communication and counter-narrative
The fight against extremist propaganda requires:
- institutional campaigns aimed at deconstructing radical narratives;
- strengthening the reliable information ecosystem.
The initiatives of the Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN), based on counter-narrative content co-developed with educators and psychologists, represent an effective model.
- Deradicalization and reintegration
Exit programs from extremism must be individualized and multi-level, including:
- personalized interventions;
- integrated support networks;
- periodic monitoring of effectiveness.
Countries such as Denmark and Germany adopt exit support programs with dedicated mentors who coordinate psychological, educational, and social interventions.
- International cooperation and protection of targets
Effective countering requires transnational cooperation, through tools such as the Joint Investigation Teams (JIT) of Europol and Eurojust, and targeted protection of soft targets through proportionate measures and training of civilian personnel.
The role of private securityPrivate security is an increasingly important complementary player, especially in high-traffic environments. Programs such as Vigipirate in France and Project Griffin in the United Kingdom (now integrated into the ACT Awareness programs) demonstrate the importance of advanced training and shared protocols.
