While tanks remain stationary, the real battle is being fought in the cyber realm, through disinformation and the erosion of trust. Russia and other actors are undermining the operational continuity of states (see Estonia in 2007 and 2017) and sowing doubt within societies, particularly in the cognitive domain. The Baltic and Nordic countries teach us a lesson: resilience is built through media literacy, coordination between the public and private sectors, public engagement, and long-term preparedness. Italy is not immune. Geographical distance does not mean safety. Our main weakness? Institutional fragmentation and a weak security culture. The Prime Ministerial Decree of January 8, 2026, is a first step, but more is needed: a national resilience strategy inspired by Nordic and Baltic models, with institutional continuity and the involvement of the entire civil society. The war of the future is already here. And it makes no noise.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
- The report analyzes hybrid warfare in the Euro-Atlantic area, with particular attention to the Baltic and Nordic cases, highlighting how contemporary competition consistently unfolds below the threshold of open conflict through the integration of military and non-military tools.
- In this context, hybrid warfare does not aim for physical destruction, but for decision-making paralysis and the erosion of collective trust. The cyberattacks on Estonia in 2007, the eID system crisis in 2017, and recent vulnerabilities in the Baltic Sea reflect a recurring logic: targeting the state’s operational continuity.
- The most lasting effects manifest in the cognitive domain, where influence operations undermine trust in institutions and the narrative coherence of societies. Nordic models demonstrate how resilience in this area stems from long-term policies grounded in media literacy and coordination between public and private actors.
- The Estonian experience highlights the link between digitalization and sovereignty: innovation strengthens the state but introduces vulnerabilities that require advance preparation and operational continuity. In the Baltic countries, resilience is built on the integration of territorial defense, unconventional resistance, and public engagement, increasing the costs of an attack without eliminating the possibility of one.
- At the same time, Nordic cooperation demonstrates how strategic alignment can precede formal membership in military alliances, through operational planning already established prior to 2022.
- For Italy, geographical distance from Russia does not equate to immunity. The main critical issues concern the cognitive domain, the fragmentation of the institutional response, and the limited prevalence of a security culture. In this context, the Prime Ministerial Decree of January 8, 2026, represents a significant step in strengthening intelligence coordination.
- Overall, a comparison with Nordic and Baltic models highlights the need to develop a long-term resilience strategy in Italy as well, based on institutional continuity, interagency integration, and the involvement of civil society.