Introduction
Over the last twenty-five years, Russian-Iranian cooperation has spanned sensitive and strategic sectors, ranging from civil nuclear assistance, which emerged in the 1990s with the Bushehr power plant, to more recent collaborations in the military-technological field, with particular reference to unmanned systems. This trajectory reflects a constant dynamic: Moscow and Tehran, subjected to Western pressure and sanctions, have turned restrictions into incentives to develop parallel channels of technological and military interaction.
Civil nuclear power as the first testing ground (1995–2015)
The symbol of Russian-Iranian cooperation in the technological field remains the Bushehr plant. After the suspension of contracts with Western countries, it was the Russian company Atomstroyexport that completed the plant, which began operating in 2011. For Tehran, Bushehr was proof that a major international player was willing to overcome Western pressure and collaborate in a strategic sector. For Moscow, the project was both a return to the international nuclear market and a sign of political autonomy.
The Bushehr project was, in fact, the first major foreign nuclear construction project for post-Soviet Russia. After the collapse of the USSR, no other country would agree to build a reactor in Iran after the 1979 revolution. The site, originally started by the German company Siemens in the 1970s, had been severely damaged during the Iran-Iraq war in 1984. It was only in 1992, with a new climate of economic cooperation, that Iran and Russia signed a long-term agreement that included two protocols for the construction of nuclear power plants for civilian use, including the one in Bushehr.
The agreement provided for extensive cooperation: construction of power plants, fuel cycle, supply of research reactors, reprocessing of spent fuel, production of isotopes for scientific and medical research, and training of Iranian technicians at the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute (MEPhI) (see Habibi Roudsari, “Iran’s Nuclear Program in the Context of Russian-Iranian Relations,” Cyberleninka.ru).
In 1993, Russian foreign intelligence (SVR RF) estimated that Iran was indeed conducting military nuclear research, but that it was still a long way from operational capability: not before ten years. Moscow’s approach therefore remained cautious: to encourage civil cooperation while maintaining manageable relations with the West.
In January 1995, the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization and the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy signed the final agreement to complete Bushehr and plan the construction of three more reactors. The contractual commitment was to complete the work in 55 months, but the plant was only completed in August 2010, after delays due to financial difficulties, technical obstacles, and international pressure.
The then Russian Minister of Atomic Energy, Viktor Mikhailov, summarized the logic of the project as follows:
“What could Russia offer on world markets? We had only one strength: our scientific and technical potential. Our only chance was cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear energy, a sector in which Minatom remained the leader.” (Russian-Iranian Nuclear Cooperation: 1992-2006 Ter-Oganov, Center for Iranian Studies)
At that time, Russia was going through a deep economic and institutional crisis. The agreement with Tehran represented an opportunity for industrial as well as geopolitical survival. It is estimated that Moscow earned between $800 million and $900 million from the project, a considerable sum at the time, especially considering that Iran would pay 80% in hard currency. (Center for Strategic and International Studies Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy “Iranian Nuclear Weapons? The Uncertain Nature of Iran’s Nuclear Programs”)
Although Russia was not seeking a direct confrontation with the United States in the Middle East, it saw Bushehr as a means of reaffirming its technological and diplomatic presence, using energy cooperation as a tool to return to the international stage.
At the same time, Moscow continued to provide technical and scientific assistance to Iranian programs under the supervision of the IAEA. While maintaining an official line of compliance with the agreements, Russia took an ambivalent position: mediator between Tehran and the Western powers, but also an essential industrial partner for the development of Iran’s civil nuclear program.
During the recent attacks ordered by US President Donald Trump against Iranian nuclear sites in 2025, the Bushehr plant was not hit. According to international sources, this decision was dictated by the risk of a radiological disaster in the event of an impact on the reactor. The director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Rafael Grossi, stressed that a direct attack on Bushehr could have compromised the security of the entire region, leading to the dispersion of radioactive material (Wall Street Journal, June 22, 2025).
The exclusion of the Bushehr site from military targets therefore confirms its unique role: not only a symbol of Russian-Iranian cooperation, but also a strategic balancing point that none of the regional players—neither Washington, Tel Aviv, nor Moscow—can afford to compromise.
Sanctions and resilience: a strengthened alliance (2010–2025)
International pressure on Iran’s nuclear program—starting with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s announcement of 20% enrichment in 2010 and the subsequent UN Resolution 1929—marked the beginning of a phase in which Moscow and Tehran strengthened economic and technological ties to mitigate the effects of external restrictions. Russia maintained a dual approach: on the one hand, it participated in multilateral initiatives and Security Council votes aimed at containing the Iranian program; on the other, it maintained strategic bilateral relations with Iran, offering trade channels, technical assistance (including the Bushehr project), and political and diplomatic leeway.
The election of Hassan Rouhani and the subsequent conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015 produced a window of partial normalization: the agreement limited enrichment and established extensive IAEA controls, while Russia played a leading role in defining technical and verification mechanisms. However, the unilateral withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA in 2018 and the reintroduction of American sanctions pushed Tehran and Moscow back towards greater cooperation on economic and technological resilience.
In September 2025, the ‘snapback’ mechanism provided for in the UN resolution that had approved the JCPOA was activated by the European powers (E3: France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) and resulted in the automatic reimposition of a series of international restrictions on Tehran. The reactivation was communicated and implemented by numerous international actors, with consequent measures at the level of the European Union and individual states.
The snapback action was motivated by Iranian violations of non-proliferation obligations—in particular, the acceleration of enrichment levels and the expansion of fissile material stocks—and resulted in measures reinstating bans on exports of sensitive materials and technologies, restrictions on armaments, and financial pressure instruments. The reimposition of international measures had immediate effects: in addition to regulatory action by the EU and individual governments, the US Treasury Department announced targeted measures against Iranian supply networks in line with the restoration of sanctions status.
However, the decision has caused a diplomatic rift: Russia and Iran have challenged the political and legal legitimacy of the measure—Moscow has called it “non-binding” in its official communications—while other multilateral and regional actors have supported the need to reaffirm controls. This contrast reflects the nature of the Russian-Iranian partnership: deep cooperation on practical and technical aspects, but with clear political limits when international positions become polarized.
The reactivation of the snapback clause reaffirms two key features of the post-JCPOA non-proliferation system: (a) the persistence of multilateral instruments with automatic technical response capabilities; (b) the dependence of political effects on the alignment (or lack thereof) of key actors in the Security Council. For Moscow and Tehran, the result is twofold: on the one hand, greater pressure on supply chains and technological procurement options for Iran; on the other, a renewed push for diversification of trade routes and technical-industrial cooperation — including in the defense and drone sectors — where sanctions hinder traditional channels.
In practical terms, the speed of reimposition and the scope of the measures require European observers and decision-makers to closely monitor dual-use industrial chains, unconventional financial flows, and the resilience of critical infrastructure. At the same time, Russia’s reaction — ambiguous on a political level but concrete on a practical level — confirms the nature of an “instrumental partnership”: Moscow is ready to cooperate with Tehran where the economic and strategic advantages are clear, but not to completely sacrifice its ability to engage with other regional and global actors.
From nuclear power to drones: the new phase (2020–2025)
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 ushered in a new season of economic and technological sanctions against Moscow, comparable in intensity and scope to those experienced by Tehran in the 2000s. This simultaneous isolation created fertile ground for an unprecedented rapprochement between the two countries, based on a principle of mutual necessity: Russia, an industrial power but deprived of access to Western markets, and Iran, a laboratory of technological resilience accustomed to operating under embargo, combined their respective experiences in the fields of defense, aerospace, and military electronics.
If in the 1990s the Bushehr power plant was the symbol of nuclear cooperation and defiance of international sanctions, today the same role is played by the Shahed-131/136 drones, supplied by Iran and renamed Geran-2 in Russia. These low-cost aircraft, used extensively in the Ukrainian conflict, have demonstrated Tehran’s ability to transfer strategic know-how and Moscow’s ability to quickly adapt it to its own operational needs. The joint production of drones has thus become the new axis of Russian-Iranian cooperation, marking the transition from ‘civilian nuclear’ to ‘dual military’.
The bilateral dynamic has developed according to a well-established pattern:
- International isolation as a driving factor. Both Moscow and Tehran have converted sanctions into a catalyst for autonomous innovation and South-South cooperation.
- Russia as an integrator of Iranian technologies. Russian engineers have modified Iranian drone designs to adapt them to their own industrial standards, replacing critical components with Russian or Asian equivalents.
- The creation of parallel industrial and logistical circuits. Through networks of front companies, commercial triangulations, and logistical hubs in third countries (such as Armenia and Kazakhstan), the two countries have continued to exchange sensitive materials while circumventing sanctions regimes.
According to international investigations and Western intelligence sources, in 2024 Russia launched local production lines for drones derived from the Shahed models in the Yelabuga industrial zone in Tatarstan. The goal, according to estimates published by The Washington Post and the think tank Institute for Science and International Security, is to achieve self-sufficiency by 2026, producing up to 6,000 units per year. Satellite images shown by CNN and Reuters have confirmed the presence of new hangars and test tracks in the area, as well as the cooperation of Iranian technicians on site.
This synergy is part of a changing geopolitical context. While the West is stepping up restrictions on exports of microchips, optical components, and navigation software, Tehran is providing Moscow with the platforms and knowledge necessary to maintain the production of drones and circuitry ammunition. Moscow, for its part, provides financial resources, diplomatic cover, and access to Euro-Asian logistics networks, thus ensuring the continuity of Iranian supplies.
The parallel with the nuclear experience is clear. Just as in the 1990s, collaboration on Bushehr allowed Tehran to develop expertise and Moscow to reaffirm its technological influence, today the bilateral drone production program represents an alliance of strategic survival. ‘Shared technology under sanctions’ becomes a political tool: a way to assert autonomy from the Western economic order and to build alternative production chains.
In 2025, the activation of the snapback mechanism by the E3 (France, Germany, United Kingdom) reestablished international sanctions against Iran, further aggravating Tehran’s economic isolation. However, the reimposition of measures did not curb cooperation with Moscow. On the contrary, the context of common pressure has prompted the two countries to strengthen industrial and military ties, transforming the “partnership of necessity” into a stable architecture of mutual dependence.
Today, joint drone production in Tatarstan is just the tip of the iceberg of a broader system that includes exchanges on missile technology, air defense, and electronic intelligence. The experience accumulated over decades of nuclear cooperation—from transfers of know-how to fuel cycle agreements supervised by Moscow—has formed the cultural and organizational basis on which the new era of Russian-Iranian military-industrial cooperation was born.
Ultimately, the Moscow-Tehran axis in the drone sector represents the logical continuation of a model of cooperation developed under sanctions and consolidated by a mutual need for strategic survival. Like Bushehr in the 1990s, the Geran-2 of 2020 embodies the idea of a partnership based on resilience, technological adaptability, and the progressive construction of an alternative order to that of the West.
Conclusion
The trajectory from Bushehr to the Geran-2 demonstrates how Russian-Iranian cooperation has become a structural axis of Eurasian geopolitics. It is no longer a matter of episodic collaboration, but of a long-term infrastructure that unites sensitive sectors—nuclear, defense, aerospace, electronics—in a network of industrial and diplomatic resilience capable of withstanding the pressure of sanctions. Past experience shows that each wave of international isolation, rather than breaking the ties between Moscow and Tehran, has accelerated their technical and logistical integration.
For Italy and Europe, this evolution implies two key lessons. First, it must be recognized that the Moscow-Tehran axis is not only a military threat, but also a source of “alternative” technological innovation, operating outside Western control regimes and challenging the monitoring capabilities of multilateral institutions. Second, sanctions, if not accompanied by targeted containment strategies and technological deterrence tools, can become a driver of cooperation between revisionist powers opposed to the sanctions regime.
In 2000, Russian-Iranian collaboration was focused on a single infrastructure project, the Bushehr power plant; by 2025, it has become a military-technological supply chain with direct implications for European security. The joint production of drones, the sharing of electronic components, and the creation of parallel supply channels represent a test bed for export control policies and the strategic cohesion of the Euro-Atlantic bloc.
For Italy, the priority cannot be limited to formal compliance with sanctions regimes, but must translate into active monitoring of dual-use chains, strengthening investigative capabilities, and supporting European economic intelligence initiatives. At the same time, it is necessary to anticipate the geopolitical consequences of a partnership that shows no signs of ending: the growing convergence between Moscow and Tehran could influence the eastern Mediterranean, the Caucasus, and even the energy dynamics involving our country.
In short, from civil nuclear power to drone production, the Russian-Iranian relationship embodies a model of technological adaptation and survival under pressure. For Europe and Italy, understanding its logic and mechanisms is not just an exercise in analysis, but a strategic necessity to defend their industrial, political, and security autonomy in the new multipolar context.
