In foreign policy, timing is almost never random. When it seems that way, it’s because you’re looking at the wrong sequence of events. Guido Crosetto’s mission to the Persian Gulf—Jeddah on April 21, Abu Dhabi on April 22, and Doha as the final stop—comes just a few weeks after Giorgia Meloni’s blitz in early April (April 3–4, 2026), which had visited exactly the same countries: Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. Same geographical trajectory, same strategic axis, but a different level: from the high-level realm of political relations to the more operational and military terrain. This is no coincidence, but rather a deliberate strategy, a second move in a broader game that sees Italy committed to strengthening its presence in the wider Mediterranean region and in European energy security.
The context in which this dual mission is unfolding is marked by acute regional tension and a concrete energy crisis. The Iranian attacks of recent months (drones and missiles targeting critical infrastructure, ports, and energy facilities in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar) have made it clear that the vulnerability of maritime routes and supply chains is no longer an abstract risk. In particular, the attacks on the Ras Laffan complex in Qatar led to a declaration of force majeure by Qatar Energy: ten shipments of liquefied natural gas (LNG) destined for Italy were canceled through mid-June, with an estimated impact of 17% on Qatar’s export capacity and an annual loss of approximately $20 billion for Doha. Recovery will take 3–5 years.
The Strait of Hormuz, through which approximately 20% of the world’s oil and a significant portion of LNG destined for Europe passes, has become a strategic bottleneck. For Italy, which imports 95% of the gas it consumes and generates over 40% of its electricity from gas-fired sources—with 45% of its pre-crisis LNG coming from Qatar—the Gulf is no longer merely a supplier of hydrocarbons, but an essential hub for the resilience of the national and continental energy system. In this context, the request from the Gulf countries was not of a general political nature, but operational and concrete: integrated air defense systems, anti-drone capabilities, protection of sensitive infrastructure, and support for freedom of navigation.
Crosetto did not act on his own initiative. As he himself stated in Parliament, the mission is a direct response to clear signals received from Gulf capitals. It is the logical next step following the preparatory work carried out by President Meloni, who opened high-level political channels and reaffirmed Italy’s solidarity in the face of Iranian aggression. President Meloni paved the way; Minister Crosetto is making it stable and operational. This division of tasks reflects a mature governmental stance, capable of integrating diplomacy and defense into a single coherent strategy.
The Saudi leg: solidarity, Hormuz, and industrial prospects
The mission began on April 21 in Jeddah with the main meeting between Crosetto and Prince Khalid bin Salman bin Abdulaziz, Saudi Minister of Defense. The discussion had two main themes. On the one hand, an expression of solidarity regarding the attacks suffered by the Kingdom and a reference to the defensive military assistance already provided by Italy. On the other, a structural agenda: freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, cooperation between armed forces, and prospects for industrial partnerships in the defense sector. Crosetto was also received by the Saudi Chief of Staff, General Fayyad Al-Ruwaili, a sign of dialogue involving operational leadership.
In Saudi Arabia, the issue of regional security takes on particular significance, especially given the need to bypass Hormuz. Riyadh has been on the front lines for years against asymmetric threats—Yemeni Houthis backed by Tehran, low-cost drones, and hybrid attacks—and views Italy as a reliable European partner, not only for military aspects but also for opportunities in technological co-development. The Petroline, a historic pipeline built in the 1980s as an alternative to the Strait of Hormuz (1,200 km from the Gulf to the port of Yanbu on the Red Sea, with a capacity of 7 million barrels per day), now allows Saudi oil closer to Italian facilities to be routed directly to Suez and the Mediterranean. The World Defense Show, held right here in Saudi Arabia, represents an opportunity to strengthen industrial ties: Leonardo, Fincantieri, and other Italian companies in the sector can play an increasingly important role in a market seeking to diversify away from traditional Western suppliers.
Abu Dhabi: Signing of a Letter of Intent and Maritime Security
The following day, April 22, the minister landed in Abu Dhabi. Here, the dialogue took on even greater political significance. The meeting with President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan placed the visit within a broad bilateral framework, ranging from defense and security cooperation to recent developments in the Middle East and their repercussions on regional and international stability. The issue of maritime security emerged prominently, linked to the repercussions of tensions in the Strait of Hormuz and on global commercial traffic.
The most concrete outcome was the signing of a letter of intent with the Minister of State for Defense Affairs, Mohamed Bin Mubarak Bin Fadhel Al Mazrouei. The document aims to consolidate and expand cooperation in training, the exchange of experiences, dialogue between armed forces, and overall strategic partnership. Through the Habshan-Fujairah pipeline (ADCOP, 1.8 million barrels per day to the port of Fujairah outside the Strait of Hormuz), the UAE offers an additional alternative corridor of fundamental importance for route diversification. The UAE, which has invested heavily in modernizing its defense capabilities, views Italy as a pragmatic partner, less influenced by internal European dynamics than other partners. The visit confirmed that Abu Dhabi seeks not only supplies but also operational integration and the sharing of expertise.
Doha: Defense Coordination and Qatar’s Mediation Role
The mission concluded in Doha with two high-profile meetings: first with Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense Sheikh Saoud bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, then with Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani. The focus of the discussions shifted to coordination in the defense sector and the latest developments in the crisis. Crosetto expressed Italy’s solidarity regarding the damage suffered by Qatari infrastructure and highlighted Qatar’s historic role as a pragmatic mediator in the region.
Qatar occupies a unique position: a major gas producer (Italy imports about 10% of its needs from Qatar), a mediator in various Middle Eastern issues, and a logistical base for Western presence. In addition to military dialogue, the mission consolidates Italy’s offer of technical assistance for the reconstruction of Ras Laffan (a multibillion-dollar investment that places Rome in pole position for future supply contracts) and strengthens preferential access to volumes from the Golden Pass project in Texas (a Qatar Energy-ExxonMobil joint venture). The dialogue with Doha reinforces Italy’s position as a reliable partner for long-term energy stability as well.
The Overall Strategic Value of the Mission
Viewed as a whole, the Meloni-Crosetto sequence defines a clear and consistent Italian line. This is no longer an episodic foreign policy, but a systemic approach that links energy security, the protection of critical infrastructure, and the projection of influence in the Gulf. For years, the relationship was straightforward: Europe bought energy, and the Gulf supplied and guaranteed stable flows. Today, that simplicity is a thing of the past. Routes have lengthened, points of vulnerability have multiplied, and the distinction between “energy policy” and “security policy” has evaporated.
Italy, with this dual mission, is not content to be merely a premium customer. It is seeking to become part of the mechanism that makes those flows possible: by contributing to deterrence, maritime surveillance, anti-drone protection, and industrial cooperation. This marks a shift from the past, when Italy’s presence in the Gulf was more focused on trade than on shared security. Today, Rome positions itself as a bridge between Europe and the Gulf, at a time when the United States is partially reducing its footprint and other actors (China, Russia, Turkey) are seeking opportunities. In this context, the port of Trieste and the Trans-Alpine Pipeline (TAL) take on continental strategic importance: 100% of the oil destined for Bavaria, 90% for Austria, and about 50% for the Czech Republic pass through here, transforming Italy into a southern energy hub for the industrial heart of central-northern Europe.
This stance has broader implications. It reinforces the concept of the “enlarged Mediterranean” central to the national security strategy, integrates the defense component into energy diplomacy, and positions Italy as a proactive European actor in a crucial region for transition and resilience. All of this is in line with the Mattei Plan, Italy’s framework for energy and infrastructure partnerships with African and Mediterranean countries: from the Saudi memorandums on desalination and renewables to ENI’s joint ventures with ACWA Power, up to the Fincantieri and Elettronica projects already integrated into the Gulf’s production chains. It is not yet a fully formed and detailed strategy, but the movements on the ground (two closely spaced missions, same capitals, a progressive agenda from political to operational) speak volumes.
For Italy, freedom of the seas is not an abstract principle of international law, but a vital national interest. Over 80% of international trade travels by sea, and the Italian maritime economy alone generates about 11% of the national GDP. Iran’s actions in the Strait of Hormuz therefore represent a direct threat not only to energy flows but to the country’s very ability to keep its supplies and exports open.
In geopolitics, sequences and continuity matter more than official statements. Crosetto’s mission, following Meloni’s, sends a clear signal: Italy is investing in its strategic presence in the Gulf not out of abstract ambition, but out of a concrete need for national and European security. In a world where fault lines are multiplying, those who can build stable, multidimensional relationships gain room to maneuver. Rome seems to have understood this.
Photo: Ministry of Defense, CC 4.0 SA by
