Introduction. The Paradoxical Genealogy of a Constitutive Hatred
To reconstruct, in a nutshell, Islamist antisemitism—in the specific case of this paper, supported by and deeply indebted to a recent, highly significant study by Daniel Allington, titled Islamist antisemitism: a neglected hate (2025)—and centered on the analysis of how antisemitism is embedded in the language, culture, and practices of British Muslim communities—necessarily means confronting a radical contradiction: that of a hatred that is apparently “endogenous” yet radically “exogenous” in its theoretical foundations. Whereas the prevailing narrative has often portrayed interfaith relations in the Muslim world through an “essentialist” lens, positing a sort of “age-old hostility” between the parties involved, a detailed historical analysis reveals instead a phenomenon of an entirely different nature.
Prior to the early decades of the twentieth century, relations between Jews and Muslims, although characterized by power asymmetries and episodic forms of violence, were not permeated by that conspiratorial and genocidal dimension that constitutes the hallmark of contemporary antisemitism. Violence against Jewish communities manifested in localized forms and did not pursue the systematic and total elimination of a people. Conversely, Jews were conceived as a subordinate entity, a group of non-believers tolerated by virtue of their legal status as dhimmi within the Islamic theocratic structure.
This theoretical and practical framework, however, underwent an epochal transformation during the historical period coinciding with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the emergence of Zionism as a movement for Jewish national self-determination. The significant historical fact, however, is that this transformation did not arise from an immanent change within Islamic theology, but rather from the introduction of ideological elements of clearly European origin. The consequence of this process of ideological hybridization is the emergence of a genuinely new form of antisemitism, simultaneously rooted in Islamic language yet fundamentally dependent on theoretical categories and apocalyptic fantasies developed within the European context—a phenomenon that represents, at the same time, a betrayal of Islam’s historical values and an unwitting homage to the conceptual structures of Nazism.
Understanding this paradoxical genesis, therefore, requires abandoning reductive interpretations that attribute this phenomenon to a mere reflection of territorial or political conflicts. On the contrary, it is necessary to recognize the ideological autonomy and conceptual violence through which Nazi propaganda systematically transposed European genocidal fantasies into a religious grammar, thereby transforming a geopolitical issue into a ‘cosmological antagonism’ between the divine and the profane.
The Theological-Political Structuring of Hatred: From Nazism to the Muslim Brotherhood to Jihadist Salafism
The ideological architecture through which antisemitism has been incorporated into the various currents of contemporary Islamism does not present uniform features, but rather reveals a multiplicity of variants developed according to specific geopolitical logics. Nevertheless, a common thread runs through all these variations: the rearticulation of European hatred through the reinvention of historical religious conflicts as the ontological foundation for perpetual antagonism. Muhammad Amin al-Husseini, Mufti of Jerusalem and collaborator with the Nazi regime, constitutes the pivotal figure around whom this theoretical transmutation has crystallized. In practice, this was not a simple act of propaganda, but a conceptual operation that gave rise to a mythology of religious antiquity, where alleged conflicts between the Prophet and local Jewish tribes were decontextualized and rewritten as the primordial episode of a religious war destined to perpetuate itself until the end of time.
The evolutionary trajectory of this ideology differs when considering the main currents of Islamism. First of all, the Muslim Brotherhood, founded by Hassan al-Banna in the early 20th century, incorporated into its doctrinal corpus the tension between a project of caliphal restoration and the assimilation of elements of fascist ideology. Al-Banna, though theoretically motivated by the need for religious revival, did not hesitate to model himself on European paramilitary organizations and to provide an ideological haven for al-Husseini’s anti-communist ideas. Subsequently, Sayyid Qutb, an extraordinarily influential Egyptian thinker, radicalized the doctrine underpinning the Brotherhood, transforming anti-Semitism from an incidental element into an essential and inescapable pillar of jihadist cosmology. In his work titled Our Struggle with the Jews, Qutb articulates a worldview in which Islamic civilization is besieged by an imaginary global Jewishness, guilty of every moral and spiritual corruption suffered by the dār al-Islām. This formulation, while certainly representing a reinterpretation of religious sources, primarily presents itself as a rewriting of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion through Koranic language, such as to produce an ideological synthesis in which the Jewish conspiracy—a constituent element of European anti-Semitic fantasy—is reincarnated within the Islamic theological framework.
The Salafi jihadist matrix has further radicalized this synoptic fusion, creating an ideological-religious framework in which the struggle against Judaism becomes an essential component of a worldview marked by the dichotomy between jahiliyya—pre-Islamic ignorance—and authentic Islamic order. According to this perspective, Jews, in addition to being territorial enemies, are portrayed as the embodiment of the moral corruption and apostasy permeating the contemporary world. Qutb’s theoretical innovation, taken up and particularly radicalized by his jihadist followers, consists in equating the maintenance of the unjust political status quo with religious apostasy (takfir), thereby producing a theologically elaborate justification for indiscriminate violence not only against Jews, but against any Muslim authority deemed contaminated by Western influence.
The third strand of contemporary Islamism, represented by Shi’ite Islamism and its fullest expression, which took shape and manifested itself in the Iranian Revolution, has absorbed similar conceptual frameworks through its own channels. Ayatollah Khomeini, founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, was an avid consumer of Nazi radio propaganda during his political youth, and for this reason, his early works are interwoven with references to the “Jewish enemy” as a factor of political and spiritual corruption. Although a systematic comparative study on this subject is lacking, it is reasonable to infer that Shi’ite Islamism has absorbed elements of European antisemitism through mediation processes analogous to those operating in the Sunni context, although the specificities of Shi’ite theology have produced different emphases on the issue of religious contamination of the community of believers.
The rhetoric of decolonization: a progressive mask for anti-Jewish hatred
From Allington’s study, which serves as inspiration here, it is evident that one of the most significant features of the contemporary (re)configuration of Islamist antisemitism lies specifically in its ability to conceal itself behind a language of decolonization and anti-imperialist resistance, and this through a process of rhetorical domestication, which is not an accidental distortion but rather the result of a deliberate discursive strategy rooted in the propaganda of the Hitler regime itself. Indeed, as the Nazis pursued their European expansionist ambitions, they presented themselves precisely as an anti-imperialist and anti-colonial movement in the eyes of the Arab peoples, and, at the same time, translated their genocidal delusions into religious language intended to mobilize the Muslim masses against Judaism. This paradoxical legacy—in which exterminationist hatred “transmutes” into the form of post-colonial liberation—continues to operate with extraordinary effectiveness in the contemporary context, where significant portions of the Western political left have adopted the language of Palestinian decolonization without grasping (?) how deeply it was interwoven with ideological elements—which are indeed! – deeply totalitarian, violent, and intolerant.
If, however, the rhetoric of coloniality, which permeates anti-Semitic Islamist discourse, is examined analytically, it does not appear to entail a genuine and radical critique of imperialism in the Marxist theoretical sense, but rather, in reality, represents a disguise for the desire both to restore absolute Muslim supremacy and, at the same time, to establish a political configuration in which Jews—while tolerated as subordinate subjects—would have no right to political sovereignty. Furthermore, this shift from a materialist analysis of imperialist power relations toward a veritable religious conceptual kaleidoscope of the natural subordination of Jews is facilitated by the superficial compatibility between anti-colonial language and the theocratic aspirations of Islamism. That said, it can be argued that, in this context, Islamist antisemitism acquires a dual legitimation: on the one hand, that deriving from its roots in the Islamic past (albeit reinterpreted and distorted); on the other, that conferred by a rhetoric that appears to be in harmony with global progressive liberation movements. Viewed in this light, this dynamic represents, perhaps, the most dangerous aspect of contemporary Islamist anti-Semitism, as it allows it to circulate within political and academic circles that would otherwise strongly resist more explicit forms of religious prejudice.
Contemporary radicalization and organizational fragmentation: from mosques to digital platforms
The interviews conducted by Allington in his study with experts in countering extremism in the United Kingdom reveal a contemporary landscape of radicalization that has changed drastically compared to the theoretical paradigms developed by an earlier historical phase of studies on Islamism and jihadist terrorism. Although, in fact, geopolitical conflicts—particularly the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—continue to function as a narrative and psychological trigger for such radicalization, what clearly emerges from recent empirical literature is that antisemitism represents a constitutive and essential element of the ideological sensibility of Islamist extremism rather than an epiphenomenal reflection of the Middle Eastern conflict. In this regard, it is worth noting how strongly the interviewees emphasized that “narratives of lamentation and grievance” —centered on the concept of Muslim suffering and the global persecution of the community of Islamic believers—are systematically conveyed through the use of images of Palestinian violence and through the discursive strategy of theological humiliation that the existence of a Jewish state entails/would entail for the Islamic divine order.
Furthermore, recent research is revealing a phenomenon of “organizational decentralization” unprecedented in the history of Islamist extremism. Whereas previous historical phases were characterized by a vertical hierarchical structure, with ideologues and formal organizations providing the doctrinal framework and strategic directives, the contemporary landscape is, instead, highly fragmented into a multitude of independent influencers on social media, preachers not formally affiliated with recognized movements, and online communities that self-determine their own discourses of radicalization. This progressive evolution has fundamental theoretical implications for understanding the mechanisms of radicalization, namely the fact that, despite the absence of a centralized organizational structure, this does not in any way preclude the existence of internal ideological coherence; on the contrary, upon closer inspection, anti-Semitic ideas and those regarding the necessity of jihadist violence circulate with even greater freedom, more deeply infiltrate the margins of the Muslim community, and acquire a sort of “cultural naturalness” the moment they cease to be explicitly articulated as doctrinal teachings.
In this significant context, the role played by sermons in mosques and their radicalizing consequences is particularly noteworthy. The individuals interviewed by Allington in his report reported an intensification of inflammatory rhetoric coinciding with periods of escalation and hardening of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with preachers always ready to spread the belief that Allah blesses the killing of Jews and that the liberation of Palestine is a primary religious duty. Although, however, some spiritual leaders did not necessarily intend to incite attacks against Jews in the British diaspora, the rhetoric they employed obviously served only to create an environment that implicitly legitimized violence against Jews, to the point of almost making it normal, ordinary, and indispensable. The complexity of this situation—where implicit and/or explicit incitement transforms into overt violence through psychological and social processes that remain opaque to direct empirical observation—makes the application of traditional criminal law extremely difficult and reveals a structural inadequacy in the intelligence and prevention mechanisms of both the UK and other countries afflicted by the same complex social phenomenon.
The statistical association between antisemitism and extremism
The analysis of the correlation between antisemitic attitudes and extremist tendencies, conducted by a professor at King’s College London, is based on data collected as part of a quantitative study carried out via a survey commissioned by Channel 4 in 2015, which involved a sample of British Muslims and a sample of the general population. The specificity of this research lies in its focus on the relationship between hostile behaviors toward Jewish individuals and varying levels of sympathy toward Islamist extremist ideologies and groups, with particular regard to the possibility that such behaviors constitute a risk factor for the entrenchment of radical behaviors.
From a strictly methodological standpoint, the analysis is based on Likert-type measurement scales, tools widely recognized in psychological and social research for their ability to capture nuances in individual opinions and beliefs. The construction of these scales has made it possible not only to quantify the prevalence of anti-Semitic attitudes but also to assess the intensity and direction of associations with various extremist attitudes, such as political violence, support for terrorist groups, and the adoption of Islamist policies. Furthermore, the choice to use specific methodological and heuristic tools—such as rank correlation coefficients (Spearman) and logistic regression analysis —has made it possible, on the one hand, to control for demographic variables, reducing the risk of distortions due to statistical confounding factors, and, on the other hand, to isolate as much as possible the link between the two variables of interest.
Notwithstanding this useful and interesting interpretive digression on such operational and procedural technicalities, the results obtained indicate, in practice, that there is a significant connection between antisemitism and forms of extremism, with correlation values ranging around 0.20–0.23 for certain measures of sympathy toward acts of violence and support for Sharia policies in some areas of the United Kingdom. More specifically, the regression analysis showed that a one-standard-deviation increase in the level of antisemitism more than doubles the probability of adopting extreme positions in areas such as violence against those who insult the Prophet, support for the introduction of sharia, and the creation of an Islamic State. These data, therefore, suggest, from a theoretical perspective, that antisemitism may serve as an indicator of vulnerability to extremism, as well as a possible predisposing factor, both as a pre-existing element and as a consequence of adherence to radical ideologies.
In this sense, the interpretation of this association opens up multiple theoretical and political implications. First, it contributes to the definition of a model of radicalization as a cumulative and interactive process, in which anti-Semitic attitudes serve as one of the warning signs or as a vector for reinforcing extremist beliefs. The presence of this relationship also suggests a dimension of shared risk between antisemitism and jihadist ideologies, which often share narratives of persecution, global conspiracies, and the struggle against a common enemy, represented in many cases by Jews or Zionists. In this context, antisemitism emerges not merely as an isolated prejudice but as a structural element of a broader discourse of hate, which can facilitate adherence to violent policies and practices. Second, in terms of policy implications, the results of this analysis suggest the need for preventive interventions and policies aimed at countering not only extreme behaviors but also the attitudinal patterns that precede them. Identifying antisemitic attitudes as indicators of potential risk could, in fact, enhance monitoring and (direct) intervention programs, fostering a more effective preventive approach. However, this perspective also raises ethical and methodological issues, such as the fact that the use of data on the religious and political views of minorities must be carried out and managed with caution, so as not to encourage the stigmatization or discrimination of entire social groups.
In conclusion, the statistical analysis conducted within the scope of Allington’s study undoubtedly makes a fundamental contribution to understanding the dynamics of the correlation between antisemitism and extremism, regardless of the specific geographical scope of its heuristic reach. Furthermore, it invites us to reconsider such attitudes as potential indicators of vulnerability, requiring a multidimensional and integrated approach in strategies to prevent and counter violent extremism. In this regard, the current theoretical effort—with broad practical implications—consists precisely in clarifying the underlying causes of certain radical and extremist attitudes and in outlining interpretive models that enable effective intervention within the complex landscape of today’s multi-ethnic and multi-religious societies.
Conclusions. Islamist Antisemitism as an Epochal Phenomenon and the Need for a Radical Rethinking
The study of the phenomenon of contemporary Islamist antisemitism reveals the need for a decisive and resolute abandonment of the interpretive paradigms that have dominated Western public discourse in recent decades. The notion that hatred of Jews in the Muslim world is merely a secondary reflection of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or that it could be mitigated through territorial concessions and geopolitical resolutions, proves profoundly inadequate. Conversely, the historical evidence—captured both qualitatively and quantitatively and presented in Allington’s study, which is examined and explored here—calls for serious reflection on the fact that antisemitism constitutes a fundamental component of multiple currents within Islamist ideology, rooted as it is, not in the contingent circumstances of the contemporary era, but in the theoretical refoundation of Islamic theology carried out by modern Islamist thinkers.
The paradoxical genealogy of this anti-Semitism—originally European, subsequently transfigured/transliterated into Islamic religious language, and finally naturalized within the broader and more complex Muslim discursive ecosystem—testifies to the devastating effectiveness of processes of ideological transmission and the capacity of conceptual violence to transcend cultural and religious boundaries. The fact that Hitler and al-Husseini collaborated in the production of a genuinely new form of antisemitism, combining European genocidal fantasy with Arab-Muslim political frustration, not only represents a curiously paradoxical historical fact but also stands as a masterpiece of “ideological engineering,” one that continues to produce remarkably dangerous consequences in the present.
That said, the institutional failure to recognize and combat Islamist antisemitism constitutes, in turn, a noteworthy phenomenon. In the specific case raised by the work of the professor of social media analysis at King’s College London—though one that is all too easily extendable to many other national contexts, both European and beyond—British state institutions tasked with containing (Islamic) extremism—from the police to the Prevent Program, from schools to local public safety agencies—have failed to develop an adequate understanding of the specific nature of Islamist antisemitism, continuing instead to focus exclusively on manifestations of right-wing extremism, which, although they represent a real threat, do not, however, encompass the full spectrum of dangers to social cohesion and security. This gap thus appears to be linked to a broader tendency in Western progressive discourse to view Islamist theology as a form of anti-imperialist resistance, despite the obvious contradictions between the tenets of a theocratic ideology and the values of liberal democracy.
